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from federal regulation. The liability insurance crisis of recent years and the well-
publicized failures of several major insurance companies have sparked calls for federal
regulation of the insurance industry. In this Article, Professors Macey and Miller ex-
amine the exemptions from federal regulation provided in the McCarran-Ferguson
Act The authors first examine the statutory allocation of regulatory power among the
state and federal governments and posit a model of regulatory federalism describing
the existing system. The authors then apply this model to assess three issues. Consider-
ing first the insurance industry's broad exemption from antitrust regulation, the au-
thors argue that the exemption should be interpreted to allow the sharing of historical
loss cost data, but not of data on profitability or other costs. Turning next to the issue
of solvency regulation, the authors conclude that federal solvency regulation would be
unwise, but suggest that the Federal Reserve Board assume a role as lender of last
resort. Finally, the authors argue that insurance rates should be set by market forces,




I Regulatory Federalism in Insurance: Establishing
the Boundaries of State and Federal Authority ............... 20
A. State Regulation of "The Business of Insurance" . ....... 20
B. Federal Regulation of "The Business of Insurance"...... 26
1. The Federal Role in the Absence of State
Regulation .......................................... 27
a. The Antitrust Exemption ........................ 28
b. The Regulatory Exemption ...................... 30
2. Other Statutory and Constitutional Limits
* J. DuPratt White Professor of Law, Cornell University. A.B., 1977, Harvard Univer-
sity; J.D., 1982, Yale University.
** Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law, University of Chicago. A.B., 1973, Princeton Uni-
versity; J.D., 1978, Columbia University. An earlier draft of this Article was prepared as a
study for the Regulation and Federalism Project of the American Enterprise Institute for Pub-
lic Policy Research.
13
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
HeinOnline -- 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 13 1993
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
on the State's Power to Regulate .................... 31
C. The Model of State Regulation Created
by the McCarran-Ferguson Act ......................... 40
II Reconceiving the Federal Role Under
the McCarran-Ferguson Act ................................ 46
A. The Antitrust Exemption ............................... 46
1. Rationales for the Exemption ....................... 47
a. Sharing Information ............................. 47
b. Standardizing Policy Forms ...................... 53
c. Preserving Competition .......................... 54
2. The Effects of Repealing the Antitrust Exemption .... 57
a. Cooperative Research ............................ 57
b. Lobbying ....................................... 59
c. State Action ..................................... 60
d. The Boycott Exception .......................... 64
3. Conclusions ........................................ 66
B. Solvency Regulation .................................... 67
1. Current Solvency Conditions ........................ 69
2. State Solvency Regulation ........................... 71
3. Proposals for a New Federal Role
in Solvency Regulation .............................. 76
C. Rate Regulation ....................................... 80
1. State Insurance Commissions ........................ 81
2. M arket Forces ...................................... 83
CONCLUSION ................................................... 87
INTRODUCTION
Among major financial institutions in the United States, only insur-
ance firms are subject to plenary state regulation. The federal govern-
ment not only has eschewed regulation; it has affirmatively declared a
policy of not regulating the business of insurance. This is so even though
the U.S. insurance industry is the largest in the world, receiving $431
billion in premium income in 1988, an amount representing thirty-seven
percent of the total insurance premium volume worldwide.'
The policy against regulating insurance is found in the McCarran-
Ferguson Act of 1945,2 which provides, in pertinent part, that "[tlhe
business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject
to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation
of such business."' 3 The Act declares that "the continued regulation and
I See Insurance Info. Inst., Insurance Facts 15 (1991).
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1988).
3 Id. § 1012(a).
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taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in the public
interest, and . . . silence on the part of the Congress shall not be
construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of such
business by the several States."'4 It further provides that "[n]o Act of
Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law
enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insur-
ance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act
specifically relates to the business of insurance."15
In the antitrust field, the statute provides, somewhat more ambigu-
ously, that the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade
Commission Act shall apply to the business of insurance "to the extent
that such business is not regulated by State Law."' 6 The statute also pre-
serves against the insurance industry, despite the presence of state regula-
tion, a number of other statutes: the National Labor Relations Act, the
Fair Labor Standards Act, and the Merchant Marine Act.7
Although anomalous, the insurance industry's exemption from fed-
eral regulation was not particularly controversial until the 1980s. How-
ever, that decade's liability insurance crisis8 and the failures of several
major insurance companies 9 have sparked renewed interest in the Mc-
Carran-Ferguson Act, much of it critical. Members of Congress have
held hearings10 and introduced legislation 1 to overturn the antitrust ex-
4 Id. § 1011.
5 Id. § 1012(b).
6 Id.
7 Id. § 1014.
8 During this period, particularly 1985-1986, liability insurance rates skyrocketed through-
out the country and, in some cases, insurance became unavailable altogether. Particularly
hard-hit were school boards, municipalities, charities, and smaller businesses. See generally
Kenneth S. Abraham, Making Sense of the Liability Insurance Crisis, 48 Ohio St. L.J. 399
(1987).
9 Such companies include: the Executive Life Insurance Companies of California and
New York, which were, respectively, the 33rd and 85th largest firms in the North American
life insurance industry in 1990, with admitted assets of $10.2 billion and $3.2 billion, respec-
tively; Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company, which was the 21st largest North American
insurance firm in 1990, with admitted assets of $13.8 billion; and Monarch Capital Corp., the
parent of Monarch Life Insurance Co., which was the 66th largest North American insurance
company in 1990, with admitted assets of $4.5 billion. See Susan Pulliam, Mutual Benefit Life
is Expected to Ask State to Take Over as Early as Today, Wall St. J., July 15, 1991, at A3; Life
& Health Statistical Rev., Nat'l Underwriter (Life & Health/Fin. Serv. Ed.), June 10, 1991, at
S3.
10 See, e.g., The Insurance Competitive Pricing Act of 1991: Hearings on H.R. 9 Before
the Subcomm. on Economic and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d
Cong., Ist Sess. (June 13, 1991) [hereinafter H.R. 9 Hearings].
n See, e.g., H.R. 9, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (introduced by Rep. Jack Brooks); S. 430,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (introduced by Sen. Metzenbaum). H.R. 9 was reported out of
subcommittee on November 14, 1991, and out of the full House Judiciary Committee (with
amendments) on November 19, 1991. The full House failed to act on the legislation, however.
Congressman Brooks reintroduced legislation to repeal the antitrust exemption in 1993. See
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emption. 12 The General Accounting Office13 and powerful congressional
committees 14 have criticized the ways in which state regulators handle
financially troubled insurers, and proposals have been aired in Congress
NAII Blasts House Bill Limiting McCarran Act, J. Comm., Jan. 21, 1993, at All.
The powerful National Association of Professional Insurance Agents opposed this meas-
ure because of its adverse effects on independent insurance agents. See Compromise Isn't Im-
minent on Bill to Alter McCarran-Ferguson Exemption, 62 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) No. 1569, at 757 (June 11, 1992).
12 Those powerful and well-organized political forces which favor the repeal of the anti-
trust exemption include the National Association of Attorneys General, major consumer
groups, and the commercial banking industry, which is seeking entry into insurance markets.
See H.R. 9 Hearings, supra note 10, at 20 (Statement of George W. Sampson, Assistant Attor-
ney General of New York); id. at 52 (Statement of J. Robert Hunter, President, National
Insurance Consumer Organization). Important periodicals have also begun to weigh in against
the antitrust exemption. See, e.g., Bust the Insurance Cartel, N.Y. Times, May 4, 1991, at
A22; End McCarran-Ferguson, J. Comm., May 25, 1988, at A8; The Insurance Cartel is Ripe
for Busting, Bus. Wk., Apr. 11, 1988, at 138.
Groups opposing repeal of the antitrust exemption include the Alliance of American In-
surers, the American Council of Life Insurance, the Health Insurance Association of America,
the National Association of Independent Insurers, the National Association of Life Compa-
nies, the National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies, and the National Association
of Life Underwriters. See H.R. 9 Hearings, supra note 10, at 46 (Statement of S. Roy Woodall,
Jr.); Tracey L. Longo, Changes to Come, Fin. Serv. Wk., June 24, 1991, at 15.
The insurance industry traditionally has presented a united front against efforts to repeal
or weaken the antitrust exemption. However, some strains have appeared within the industry
itself. The American Insurance Association (AIA), whose members include some of the larger
insurance firms, opposed outright repeal of the exemption but indicated that it would be recep-
tive to a "safe-harbor" bill. The AIA, however, was unable to strike a compromise with repeal
advocates on the House Judiciary Committee. See Paul Dykewicz, Insurer Group Quits Talks
with Panel on Antitrust Bill, J. Comm., May 29, 1992, at AS. In addition, some individual
industry leaders have expressed the view that their firms do not need the protection of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. See, e.g., Richard L. Hall, If Solvency Is a Problem, Is Federal
Regulation the Solution, Best's Rev. (Property/Casualty Ins. Ed.), Oct. 1991, at 108 (reporting
remarks of Caleb L. Fowler, President of CIGNA Property & Casualty Companies).
The current movement to change the antitrust exemption can be dated from the Report of
the National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures 225-51 (1979).
The Report recommended repeal of the McCarran-Ferguson Act's antitrust immunity, to be
replaced by "narrowly drawn legislation... to affirm the lawfulness of a limited number of
essential collective activities under the antitrust laws." See also American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research, Federal-State Regulation of the Pricing and Marketing of Insur-
ance (P. MacAvoy ed., 1977) [hereinafter AEI Study] (influential earlier study favoring market
mechanisms for rate setting).
13 See, e.g., General Accounting Office, Insurance Regulation: Assessment of the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners (199 1) (testimony before the Subcommittee on Over-
sight and Investigations of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce); General Ac-
counting Office, Insurance Regulation: State Handling of Financially Troubled Property/
Casualty Insurers (1991); General Accounting Office, Problems in State Monitoring of Prop-
erty/Casualty Insurer Solvency (1989); General Accounting Office, Questions and Concerns
about Solvency Regulation (1991).
14 See, e.g., Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., Failed Promises: Insurance Company Insolvencies
(Comm. Print 1990).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 68:13
HeinOnline -- 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 16 1993
THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT OF 1945
to subject the insurance industry to federal regulatory oversight. 15 Others
have called for the establishment of a presidential commission to review
and report on the financial health of the insurance industry. 16
Developments outside the Capitol Beltway also have altered the
political situation. Several states-notably California, New Jersey, and
Texas-have begun to impose much more stringent regulations on the
insurance industry. 17 A number of states have repealed their "mini-Mc-
Carran-Ferguson Acts" which exempted the business of insurance from
state antitrust laws, and other states have begun to enforce their antitrust
laws with greater vigor.18 These developments have considerably re-
duced the perceived value of the antitrust exemption for many insurance
companies.
These recent events suggest the potential value of a comprehensive
review of the McCarran-Ferguson Act's pattern of regulatory federalism.
This Article attempts such a reevaluation, focusing on potential reforms
in the areas of the antitrust exemption, solvency regulation, and rate reg-
ulation. Based on our findings, we suggest the following modifications to
the Act.
First, the antitrust exemption should be interpreted in such a way as
to allow vigorous enforcement against industry practices that threaten
competition, while permitting efficiency-enhancing cooperative activities in
the areas of information sharing and analysis and the development of stan-
dardized forms. The goal of antitrust regulation of the insurance indus-
try should be to protect and enhance competitive forces. The McCarran-
Ferguson Act therefore should be interpreted to permit vigorous enforce-
ment against industry practices that suppress or threaten to suppress
competition. This indicates a relatively expansive interpretation of the
boycott exception to the Act. Similarly, state action immunity should be
limited to situations in which the activities in question are both (1) en-
15 Proposals for federal solvency regulation do not appear likely to gain congressional ap-
proval in the near future, however. See, e.g., Steven Brostoff, Feds Unlikely to Pass Insurer
Regs in 1993, Nat'l Underwriter, Mar. 15, 1993, at 4.
16 See S. 1276, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (Presidential Insurance Commission Act);
Mary Jane Fisher, Senators Seek Presidential Commission on Insurance, Nat'l Underwriter,
June 24, 1991, at 2.
17 In 1988, California required a rollback of insurance rates and applied its antitrust law to
insurance regulation as a result of a ballot referendum (Proposition 103). See 1988 Cal. Legis.
Serv. Prop. 103 (West). In June 1991, Texas enacted major insurance reform legislation, the
Omnibus Insurance Reform Bill of 1991, that, among other things, strengthened solvency re-
quirements, established an office of public insurance counsel to represent consumers in insur-
ance rate-setting proceedings, and repealed the insurance industry's exemption from the state
antitrust laws. See 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 242 (Vernon). New Jersey enacted legisla-
tion in 1990 to roll back automobile insurance rates. See 1990 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 8, § 53
(vest).
18 See notes 137-38 and accompanying text infra.
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dorsed by express state legislation or regulation, and not merely permit-
ted as a matter of administrative practice or authorized by implication,
and (2) subject to active, continuous, and meaningful state oversight.19
At the same time, however, the insurance industry is subject to spe-
cial economic problems that do not affect other industries to the same
extent. In particular, casualty and liability insurance firms need to be
able to share loss information in order to facilitate accurate pricing of
insurance products. Therefore, cooperative efforts at sharing and analyz-
ing historical loss cost information should be protected against antitrust
scrutiny. Similarly, accurate information cannot be developed-and con-
sumers cannot easily comparison shop on the basis of price-unless firms
in the industry have access to standardized forms. Cooperative efforts to
develop standardized forms thus should be protected against antitrust
scrutiny as well, although efforts to coerce insurers to use any particular
form or forms should be subject to review under the boycott exception to
the Act.
In general, recent interpretations of the McCarran-Ferguson Act
have adopted a reasonable construction of the antitrust exemption. Thus,
we do not believe that the Act is currently in need of fundamental modifi-
cation or repeal. If, however, the antitrust exemption receives a judicial
construction that interferes with the power of the federal antitrust laws
to police against threats to competition within the industry, we then
would recommend that Congress consider legislation to provide explicit
safe harbors for economically efficient cooperative activities that do not
pose serious threats to competition-such as the sharing and cooperative
analysis of historical loss data and the cooperative development of stan-
dardized forms.
Second, solvency regulation should be left to the states. There is no
convincing evidence that state solvency regulation is fatally flawed or
that federal solvency regulation would be better than the existing system.
Despite a few recent failures, the overall level of insurance company in-
solvencies has been extraordinarily low, and the insolvencies that have
occurred frequently have been triggered by unforeseeable downturns in
real estate and corporate debt markets. There is also little evidence to
suggest that insurance companies are failing due to lax supervision. Even
if state insurance departments historically exercised insufficient scrutiny
over some insurance companies, state insurance regulators are moving
rapidly to increase the stringency of their solvency regulations.
Moreover, the federal government certainly has not acquitted itself
well in the analogous field of banking regulation, where the largest finan-
cial catastrophe in the history of the United States has recently occurred,
19 See notes 178-92 and accompanying text infra.
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partly as a result of inadequate regulatory supervision by federal banking
agencies. Compared with the banking industry, which is heavily regu-
lated at the federal level, the insurance industry, with plenary state regu-
lation, is a stunning success story. Accordingly, after a century and a
half of successful state regulation, no persuasive arguments exist for fed-
eral solvency regulation at this time.
Nevertheless, a limited role for the federal government as a lender of
last resort might be warranted in solvency regulation. Such assistance
should be available to solvent firms on a fully collateralized basis to sol-
vent insurance companies faced by policyholder runs, or to property/
casualty firms faced with sudden systemic demands on their assets as the
result of a major disaster. The logical candidate to serve as such a lender
of last resort would be the Federal Reserve Board, since it already per-
forms a similar function for the banking industry. While it is unlikely
that there would be an extensive insurance industry call on the Federal
Reserve Board for liquidity loans, the advantages of temporary liquidity
assistance are sufficiently great to warrant this extension of the federal
role.
Finally, insurance rates should be set by market forces. Setting in-
surance premiums through regulation rather than through the market
will result in rates that are either too high or too low, will produce distor-
tions and shortages, will harm both consumers and producers, and will
require costly government enforcement efforts as well. In the absence
of government control or private cartelization, marketplace forces will
function effectively to set rates at optimal levels in this highly competi-
tive, unconcentrated industry.
Over the past twenty years, the trend among the states has been to
allow greater use of free market rate setting. However, several states
have recently returned or considered returning to state-controlled rates
in one form or another. Other states now impose penalties or "exit
taxes" on insurance firms that leave the state rather than comply with its
rate regulations. These "lock-in" rules undermine longstanding market-
place checks against state expropriation of insurance industry assets, and
in the long run they may well harm consumers (by reducing the supply of
insurance), undermine industry solvency, and spark an unhealthy com-
petition in which states vie to set rates at unrealistically low levels in
order to benefit their own citizens at the expense of the national interest.
As yet, this unfortunate trend towards administrative rate setting is
not so pronounced as to suggest the need for preemptive federal rate reg-
ulation. However, the problem of exit fees is serious enough to warrant
limited preemptive regulation, which would prohibit states from penaliz-
ing firms that leave a state's market or stop providing any line of insur-
ance within a state's market, if the firm's decision is based on economic
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
April 1993]
HeinOnline -- 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 19 1993
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
cost factors and is not part of any boycott or cooperative enterprise.
These federal roles under the McCarran-Ferguson Act can be
evaluated best against the backdrop of the Act itself and the pattern of
regulatory federalism it establishes. Accordingly, Part I of this Article
examines the statutory allocation of regulatory power between the state
and federal governments and how the statutory language has been inter-
preted by the courts. Part II analyzes the case for rethinking the federal
role in insurance regulation, focusing specifically on the antitrust exemp-
tion, solvency regulation, and rate regulation.
I
REGULATORY FEDERALISM IN INSURANCE: ESTABLISHING
THE BOUNDARIES OF STATE AND FEDERAL AUTHORITY
The McCarran-Ferguson Act is unusual-perhaps unique-in the
extraordinary deference it displays towards state regulation.20 Many fed-
eral statutes provide for mixed regulatory systems in which the states
play a prominent role. But few, if any, other statutes expressly assign the
states exclusive regulatory jurisdiction over an area of commerce or so
clearly disavow the value of federal regulation.
A. State Regulation of "The Business of Insurance"
As noted above, the McCarran-Ferguson Act provides that "[t]he
business of insurance . . . shall be subject to the laws of the several
States, '21 and that "[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed to invali-
date, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose
of regulating the business of insurance."'22 The statute leaves undefined
the somewhat vague phrase, "the business of insurance," and that phrase
arguably is subject to a relatively wide range of interpretations. 23
20 The pattern in the insurance industry is particularly remarkable when compared with
that applicable in related financial services industries such as banking and securities. The se-
curities industry was essentially unregulated at the federal level until 1933. See Jonathan R.
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 Tex. L. Rev. 347, 348 (1991).
Since that time, however, Congress, the courts, and the SEC steadily have increased federal
oversight to the point that state "blue sky" laws are minor, although still important, actors in
the regulatory drama. See id. Similarly, the banking industry also has been subjected to stead-
ily increasing federal regulation, following the adoption of the Banking Act in 1863 and the
creation of a system of national banks. See Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth
of Competition in the Dual Banking System, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 677, 678 (1988) ("Federal
preemption and uniformity, rather than competition and diversity, are the legal norms in
banking regulation.").
21 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (1988).
22 Id. § 1012(b).
23 For cases interpreting the phrase "the business of insurance," see 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1011-
1015 annot. (Validity, Construction, and Application of McCarran-Ferguson Act) (1988);
Dealing with Regulation of Insurance Business by State or Federal Law, 21 L. Ed. 2d 938
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For instance, "the business of insurance" might be defined narrowly
to include only the actual contract of insurance by which risk is passed
from the policyholder to the insurance company. All other aspects of the
insurance enterprise-the process by which the insurance company lays
off risk in reinsurance markets, for example-would be outside of the
definition. This interpretation is not inherently implausible: the passing
of risk from insured to insurer is certainly at the core of the insurance
enterprise, and concerted activity by the fire insurance industry with re-
spect to premium rates in the core insurance contract was the conduct
that triggered the prosecutions in United States v. South-Eastern Under-
writers Ass'n. 24
A somewhat broader reading might include within "the business of
insurance" all activities regularly conducted by those firms which have as
their principal purpose and effect the passage of risk from one party to
another. This interpretation, which looks at the basic economic function
of insurance, would encompass activities such as reinsurance or annui-
ties, if those dealings have the purpose and effect of passing risk.25
An even more expansive interpretation might include not only
transactions which have the principal purpose and effect of transferring
risk, but also transactions which are directly related to the function of
transferring risk. The relations between an insurance company and its
agents, for example, do not usually involve the transfer of risk as their
principal feature. Yet without agents, insurance which does perform the
function of transferring risk could not be sold. Thus, agency contracts,
together with a variety of other transactions by insurance companies,
would fall within the category of transactions directly related to the func-
tion of transferring risk.
The broadest interpretation of the term "the business of insurance"
would include all activities generally and traditionally engaged in by in-
surance companies. This would include, for example, investment func-
tions such as the making of loans and the purchase of securities. It
would also include all sorts of other functions necessary or convenient to
the activities of a specialized risk bearer.
(1990).
24 322 U.S. 533 (1944) (criminal prosecution under federal antitrust laws against fire insur-
ance companies that had allegedly fixed prices through participation in joint underwriting
association).
25 The passage of risk would have to be the principal reason for the transaction, since
virtually all commercial transactions of any complexity involve some allocation of risks be-
tween the parties, and the term "the business of insurance" could not possibly cover all trans-
actions in which some risk is transferred without sweeping virtually all of commerce within the
scope of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Ordinary commercial transactions in which some risk
is transferred may have an insurance feature, but they are not part of "the business of
insurance."
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The scope of state and federal regulatory power hinges on the inter-
pretation of this key phrase; accordingly, one might expect the caselaw to
be clear and well-developed. Yet the cases provide no conclusive answer
as to which interpretation, if any, correctly defines the scope of "the
business of insurance." As a rough rule of thumb, it appears that the
meaning of the phrase varies depending upon whether the case involves
antitrust or other regulatory matters.
In particular, the courts in antitrust cases have interpreted "the
business of insurance" narrowly, in accordance with the general rule
disfavoring expansive interpretations of exemptions to the federal anti-
trust laws. 26 As such, the current test in antitrust cases lies somewhere
in between the first two interpretations outlined above, and considers
whether the practice asserted to be exempt from federal antitrust scru-
tiny (1) spreads risk for the policyholder, (2) is part of a contract of in-
surance, or (3) is exclusively limited to insurance industry participants.
The first and most important factor is "whether [a particular] prac-
tice has the effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder's risk."'27
This factor reflects the Supreme Court's view of the core function of in-
surance: spreading risk, and not including other things such as offering
investment or management consulting services. Thus, in Union Labor
Life Insurance Co. v. Pireno,28 the Court held that a peer review practice
for determining reasonableness of chiropractic rates did not constitute
the business of insurance, in part because the practice was unconnected
with the spreading and underwriting of policyholder risk. Similarly, in
Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co. ,29 the Court held
that agreements between an insurer and participating pharmacies, under
which the pharmacies supplied prescription drugs to policyholders at
cost plus two dollars, did not constitute the business of insurance because
the agreements did not spread risk, but merely passed cost savings on to
policyholders and enhanced insurance company profits.30
Courts also look to "whether the practice is an integral part of the
policy relationship between the insurer and the insured" 31 in evaluating
whether a particular activity constitutes "the business of insurance" for
purposes of the antitrust exemption. The rationale for this factor is that
the "relationship between insurer and insured, the type of policy which
26 See, e.g., Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982) (noting the
Court's restraint in granting such exemptions). See generally Spencer Kimball & Barbara
Heaney, Emasculation of the McCarran-Ferguson Act: A Study in Judicial Activism, 1985
Utah L. Rev. 1.
27 Pireno, 458 U.S. at 129.
28 458 U.S. 119 (1982).
29 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
30 Id. at 213-14.
31 Pireno, 458 U.S. at 126.
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could be issued, its reliability, interpretation, and enforcement... were
the core of the 'business of insurance.'"32 Accordingly, the Court in
Pireno held that peer review procedures were not part of "the business of
insurance," partly because they were not an "integral part of the policy
relationship between insurer and insured."'33
Finally, courts in such cases also consider "whether the practice is
limited to entities within the insurance industry. ' '3 4 This criterion is
drawn from the history of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which, accord-
ing to the Supreme Court, was premised largely on the "widespread view
that it [was] very difficult to underwrite risks in an informed and respon-
sible way without intra-industry cooperation."35 In practice, this factor
has contributed to a narrow reading of "the business of insurance" in
antitrust cases. For instance, in Royal Drug Co., the Court concluded
that agreements between an insurance company and participating phar-
macies, which limited the prices charged for prescription drugs, were not
part of "the business of insurance," in part because the agreements in-
volved "the mass purchase of goods and services from entities outside the
insurance industry .... 36
The prevailing approach to defining "the business of insurance" for
antitrust purposes thus appears at first glance to offer a fairly sensible
resolution. However, the utility of a multifactor analysis obviously suf-
fers dramatically if and when the relevant factors point in different direc-
tions. As such, the test provides no method for weighting the different
factors, and it is not immediately evident which factor should be consid-
ered most important in the event they conflict. Accordingly, because the
current three-factor test is unnecessarily complicated as a means for de-
termining the scope of "the business of insurance" for antitrust purposes,
we suggest that courts move to a simpler test, which would define "the
business of insurance" for antitrust purposes as only the process of intra-
industry cooperation for the purpose of sharing information and estab-
lishing uniform rates and policy forms.37 This interpretation exempts
from federal antitrust scrutiny the practices that the McCarran-Ferguson
32 Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. at 215-16.
33 Pireno, 458 U.S. at 131.
34 Id. at 129.
35 Id. (quoting Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. at 221).
36 440 U.S. at 224.
37 For recent decisions in which this type of conduct was found to be central to "the busi-
ness of insurance," see, e.g., In re Workers' Comp. Ins. Antitrust Litig., 867 F.2d 1552, 1556
(8th Cir.) ("Although a price fixing agreement may maximize profit, it is axiomatic that the
fixing of rates is central to transferring and spreading the insurance risk."), cert. denied, 492
U.S. 920 (1989); Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 675 F.2d 308 (D.C. Cir.) (holding
that horizontal agreement among five insurance companies as to rates paid to repair shop did
not violate antitrust laws even though agreement was proven to have artificially depressed
price of repair work), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 839 (1982).
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Act was intended to insulate, and is consistent with the Supreme Court's
renewed focus on intra-industry cooperation and the transfer of risk from
policyholder to insurer through rates and policy provisions.
Thus far we have discussed "the business of insurance" as it applies
to the antitrust exemption. It is evident, however, that the interpretation
of the phrase in other regulatory settings is not necessarily the same.38
As a functional matter, the courts are adjusting the boundaries between
state and federal regulatory programs as they define the phrase "the busi-
ness of insurance." Accordingly, the task of statutory construction prop-
erly takes into account not only the policies underlying the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, but also those policies undergirding the other potentially
applicable federal regulatory schemes. As such, the interpretation given
to the phrase "the business of insurance" varies depending on the regula-
tory context in which the case arises.
For instance, in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Variable
Annuity Life Insurance Co., 39 the Supreme Court considered whether va-
riable annuity contracts40 offered by insurance companies were within
the scope of "the business of insurance" and therefore exempt from the
ambit of the federal securities laws. In concluding that variable annuity
policies are not part of the business of insurance, Justice Douglas ex-
plained for the Court that
the concept of "insurance" involves some investment risk-taking on
the part of the company. The risk of mortality, assumed here, gives
these variable annuities an aspect of insurance. Yet it is apparent, not
real; superficial, not substantial. In hard reality the issuer of a variable
annuity that has no element of a fixed return assumes no true risk in
the insurance sense. It is no answer to say that the risk of declining
returns in times of depression is the reciprocal of the fixed-dollar annu-
itant's risk of loss of purchasing power when prices are high and gain
of purchasing power when they are low. We deal with a more conven-
tional concept of risk-bearing when we speak of "insurance." For in
common understanding "insurance" involves a guarantee that at least
some fraction of the benefits will be payable in fixed amounts.41
It is easy to fault the reasoning of Variable Annuity, since Justice
38 See United States Dep't of the Treasury v. Fabe, 113 S. Ct. 2202, 2209 (1993) (scope of
general regulatory exemption for laws enacted for purpose of regulating business of insurance
is broader than scope of analogous antitrust exemption).
39 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
40 A variable annuity contract-unlike the fixed annuity contract traditionally offered by
insurance companies-ties the benefits received by the policyholder to the success of the com-
pany's investment policy. However, in other respects, the variable annuity contract resembles
traditional fixed annuities in that the company assumes mortality risk: payments are deter-
mined based on standard actuarial life expectancy tables, with the insurance company taking
the risk that a customer will live longer than expected.
41 Variable Annuity, 359 U.S. at 71.
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Douglas posited that because variable annuity policies assume only mor-
tality risk, not investment risk, they do not assume "true risk" in the
insurance sense.42 The standard fixed annuity, which the Court pre-
sumed did satisfy this test, also assigns investment risk to the customer:
it protects the customer in the event that prices go down, but the cus-
tomer bears all the risk of subsequent price increases. Yet despite these
analytical shortcomings, the holding in Variable Annuity can be justified
on policy grounds, because it represents a sound adjustment of the two
underlying statutory schemes: it does not prohibit insurance companies
from offering variable annuities, but simply subjects the offering and sale
of variable annuities to the federal securities laws. This social policy,
more than any abstract reasoning about the nature of "insurance," ex-
plains the result in the case.43
A second reason why the interpretation of the phrase "the business
of insurance" is different in general regulatory contexts than in the anti-
trust context is that the purposes underlying the McCarran-Ferguson
Act's regulatory exemption were different in that setting. As noted
above, the Act's general exemption for "the business of insurance" was
intended to ensure that state regulation and taxation of insurance could
continue in the aftermath of the Supreme Court's declaration in South-
Eastern Underwriters that insurance was commerce. 44 As such, activities
protected by the phrase "the business of insurance" in the general regula-
tory context will be those related to states' tax and general regulatory
powers.
It is clear, for example, that "the business of insurance" in the gen-
eral regulatory context encompasses advertising of insurance policies,
even though no risk is passed through advertisement.45 It also extends to
a broad range of activities for which an insurance company or agent
would need to obtain a license under state law.46 In addition, it includes
insurance company activity which is subject to state safety and soundness
regulation, and thus appears to encompass matters such as capital struc-
ture, investment portfolio choice, policy coverage, mergers, and con-
42 Id. at 71-73.
43 For other cases which opt for federal law when adjusting the boundaries between state
insurance regulation and federal securities regulation, see SEC v. National Sec. Inc., 393 U.S.
453, 465-69 (1969) (applying federal insider trading laws to alleged misrepresentations incident
to proposed merger of insurance firm, even though state insurance authority had affirmed the
merger as being fair and not contrary to law); SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S.
202, 210-12 (1967) (applying Securities Act of 1933 to annuity contract offered by insurance
company).
44 See South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. at 553.
45 See FrC v. National Casualty Co., 357 U.S. 560 (1958) (per curiam).
46 Cf. Robertson v. California, 328 U.S. 440 (1946) (applying pre-McCarran-Ferguson Act
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solidations. Thus, despite the Supreme Court's admonition that the
McCarran-Ferguson Act does "not purport to make the States supreme
in regulating all the activities of insurance companies,"47 the fact remains
that the regulatory exemption for "the business of insurance" has been
interpreted significantly more broadly than the corresponding antitrust
exemption.
In the recent case of United States Department of the Treasury v.
Fabe,48 the Court provided the most explicit instruction to date on the
scope of the general regulatory exemption. The broad category of laws
enacted "for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance" consist,
according to the Court, of laws that possess the "end, intention or aim"
of "adjusting, managing, or controlling the business of insurance. '49
This category encompasses more than the business of insurance itself, it
also includes the "actual performance of an insurance contract."50 In
Fabe, the Court concluded that a state statute giving priority in bank-
ruptcy to policyholders prevailed over the federal bankruptcy priority
statute that would have applied in the absence of the McCarran-Fergu-
son Act.51
Some additional light on the scope of the general regulatory exemp-
tion is provided by the only other Supreme Court case to address the
issue, Securities and Exchange Commission v. National Securities, Inc. 52
The Court in National Securities provided the following examples of ac-
tivities which fall within the scope of the exemption: "[t]he relationship
between insurer and insured, the type of policy which could be issued, its
reliability, interpretation and enforcement," together with "other activi-
ties of insurance companies [that] relate to their status as reliable insur-
ers."' 53 Taken together, Fabe and National Securities provide adequate
guidance as to the meaning of the general regulatory exemption. Ac-
cordingly, a new test does not appear warranted at this time.
B. Federal Regulation of "The Business of Insurance"
Even where a given activity falls within "the business of insurance"
under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, federal regulation still may be appli-
cable if (1) the state has failed to regulate the activity in question in a
sufficiently direct or immediate way; (2) Congress has explicitly overrid-
47 National Sec., 393 U.S. at 459 (emphasis added).
48 113 S. Ct. 2202 (1993).
49 Id. at 2210 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1236, 1286 (6th ed. 1990)).
50 Id.
51 Id. at 2204. However, the Court also held that the McCarran-Ferguson Act was not so
far reaching as to protect creditors other than the policyholders from federal preemption. Id.
at 2212.
52 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
53 Id. at 460.
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den state law in the applicable federal statute; or (3) the purported exer-
cise of state regulatory authority violates the federal Constitution. The
following Sections discuss how each of these situations affects the emerg-
ing pattern of regulatory federalism under the Act.
1. The Federal Role in the Absence of State Regulation
As noted above, the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not absolutely
bar the federal government from regulating the business of insurance. In
the antitrust setting, it provides instead that the federal antitrust laws
apply to the business of insurance "to the extent that such business is not
regulated by State Law."' 54 In the general regulatory setting, the statute
states that "regulation or taxation" of "the business of insurance" is to be
left to the states in the absence of clear and specific indication that federal
legislation is intended to displace state law.55 Accordingly, in the ab-
sence of some form of action by the states, federal law applies, notwith-
standing the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
This allowance for federal regulation in the absence of state action
could be interpreted in a variety of ways. The narrowest interpretation
would read the reference to state regulation to mean only that federal
laws would not apply if a state affirmatively mandated the conduct in
question. A second, slightly broader reading of the statute would find
federal regulation excluded only if the state adopted regulation at least as
stringent as that applicable at the federal level. Under this reading, if a
state adopted regulation less stringent than the federal law, then it would
not displace the federal law. A third possible reading, less hospitable to
federal enforcement, would displace federal law even where state regula-
tion is less stringent than the otherwise applicable federal law, so long as
the state regulation concerns the conduct which allegedly violates federal
law and seeks to achieve objectives broadly consistent with federal policy.
This broadest interpretation would allow the state to displace federal reg-
ulation by engaging in any regulation of the business of insurance, even if
the state's regulation had a different purpose than the federal regulation,
and even if the state regulation were less stringent or covered different
conduct than the otherwise applicable federal law.
As in the case of defining "the business of insurance," the nature
and quantity of state activity required to trigger the antitrust exemption
may be different than that required to trigger the general regulatory ex-
emption. The specific language of the statute supports distinguishing be-
tween the antitrust and general regulatory contexts. Because state
"regulation" and "taxation" oust general federal laws in the absence of
54 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
55 Id. §§ 1011, 1012(a) (emphasis added).
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specific congressional override, but federal antitrust law is displaced only
"to the extent that" the states have not regulated, the exemption should
be interpreted more narrowly in the antitrust context than in the general
regulatory context. This situation-specific theory of the degree of state
activity required to oust federal regulation appears to have been borne
out by the caselaw.
a. The Antitrust Exemption. In the antitrust setting, courts have
tended to favor the view that federal antitrust laws are displaced when
state law regulates the same conduct and serves objectives broadly con-
sistent with federal antitrust law. State antitrust laws are an obvious ex-
ample of state legislation which might displace federal antitrust law, and
the effects of such laws have become more pronounced in recent years as
an increasing number of states have abandoned their antitrust exemp-
tions for insurance companies.5 6 The few cases that have examined the
issue of whether state antitrust laws displace federal law generally con-
clude that such regulation must cover the same conduct and be at least as
stringent as the federal regulation in order to trigger the bar of the Mc-
Carran-Ferguson Act.57
A second, less obvious type of state regulation which might displace
federal antitrust law is regulation relating to the substantive conduct of
insurance companies within the jurisdiction. For instance, if a state
affirmatively has regulated rate setting by insurance companies which op-
erate within its boundaries, private cooperation in determining and set-
ting rates should not be subject to federal antitrust scrutiny. It is not
entirely clear from the cases, however, how much state involvement in
rate setting is enough to displace federal antitrust scrutiny.
Nevertheless, some educated guesses can be made about the existing
regimes of state rate regulation. The clearest case for the antitrust ex-
emption is direct, plenary state rate regulation which affirmatively man-
dates rates in some product lines.58 This type of regulation is currently
56 For example, Texas and California recently have repealed the industry's exemptions
from state antitrust laws, and campaigns to repeal state exemptions have occurred in Massa-
chusetts, Rhode Island, and other states. See Neil McGhee, Antitrust Law Exemption Chal-
lenged in Mass., R.I., Nat'l Underwriter (Life & Health/Fin. Serv. Ed.), Apr. 1, 1991, at 23.
57 For instance, in United States v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 242 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Ill.
1965), a federal antitrust challenge to allegedly anticompetitive interstate acquisitions by a title
insurance firm, the court rejected the argument that the state antitrust law displaced federal
law under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The court noted that the state did not have on the
books "a provision precisely comparable to [§ 7 of the Clayton Act] proscribing acquisition of
stock of another corporation. It is not sufficient that a state have legislated on other...
antitrust matters." Id. at 60.
58 A rule limited to state-mandated rates would be so narrow as not to go beyond the state
action antitrust exemption. See text accompanying notes 178-92 infra (explaining state action
exemption); see also Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943) (holding marketing pro-
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in effect in Massachusetts. 59 States which require rates to be filed with
the state insurance commissioner and affirmatively approved before use
also probably "regulate" rates sufficiently to displace federal antitrust
laws (at least if the approval serves as a meaningful constraint).
The argument for displacing federal law is weaker in the case of
states that permit insurance companies to charge rates without prior
state approval, subject to the requirement that the rates be fied with the
state insurance commissioner either before the rates are charged or soon
after the policies are offered at the new rates. Some states, notably Illi-
nois, permit relatively free market setting of rates.6° In such states, rates
are not required to remain within a certain band of a target rate. Nor are
companies normally required to comply with any filing provisions. How-
ever, the insurance commissioners in such states typically retain the au-
thority to intervene to interdict rates found to be discriminatory,
excessive, or inadequate, or, in some states, representative of unfair meth-
ods of competition. 61
This final approach to rate regulation is more problematic with re-
spect to the displacement of federal law than the previous alternatives.
Arguably, if rates are to be set by market forces without substantial state
oversight, then the state no longer "regulates" this part of the business
of insurance, and price-fixing by insurance companies within the state
should thereafter be subject to federal antitrust scrutiny. These consider-
ations have lead some observers to conclude that the repeal of rating laws
automatically subjects state insurance markets to federal antitrust regula-
tion.62 On the other hand, if a state, in deregulating rates, has indicated
an affirmative intent not to allow federal antitrust scrutiny-or if the
state has affirmatively indicated an intent to leave the McCarran-Fergu-
son Act exemption in place despite the deregulation-then the argument
for federal intervention is weaker than if the state affirmatively has con-
sented to the application of federal antitrust law. As yet, the applicabil-
ity of the McCarran-Ferguson Act to state rate deregulation has not been
resolved definitively. 63
gram adopted to regulate handling, disposition, and price of raisins produced within State of
California did not fall within federal antitrust laws).
59 See, e.g., Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 175A, § 5A (Law. Co-op. 1987) (authorizing commis-
sioner to set rates for medical malpractice insurance); id. ch. 175, § 113B (authorizing commis-
sioner to set rates for motor vehicle liability policies).
60 See Ruth Gastel, Rate Regulation, Ins. Issues Update (Insurance Info. Inst., New York,
N.Y.), Aug. 1993, at 8.
61 See id.
62 See, e.g., Zack Stamp, A Modest Proposal: Repeal of State Rating Laws, Best's Rev.
(Property/Casualty Ins. Ed.), Jan. 1991, at 45 ("Repealing the rating laws would ... subject
insurance pricing to federal antitrust laws.").
63 For instance, in one recent case, In re Workers' Compensation Ins. Antitrust Litig., 867
F.2d 1552 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 920 (1989), Minnesota had partially deregulated
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b. The Regulatory Exemption. The caselaw in the general regula-
tory area tends to cluster around the broadest reading of the degree of
state regulation required to displace federal regulation." In particular,
state regulation of the business of insurance is considered to oust federal
regulation when the state has adopted effective regulations specifically
relating to the subject matter addressed by the federal regulatory scheme
(whether or not the state law is as stringent as federal law). Federal reg-
ulation also is considered precluded when the state has regulated the
business so comprehensively as to occupy the field of insurance regula-
tion, even if the state does not have a specific regulation directed to the
matter which the federal government is attempting to control.
For instance, in Federal Trade Commission v. National Casualty
Co. ,65 the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) sought to apply its decep-
tive advertising rules against insurance companies acting within the
boundaries of states which proscribed unfair insurance advertising and
enforced those regulations through administrative supervision. The FTC
argued that such legislation did not displace federal authority because it
was too vague and had not been reflected in "administrative elaboration
of these standards and application in individual cases."'66 As such, the
FTC urged the Supreme Court to determine that although the states had
legislated, they had not "regulated" as required under the McCarran-
Ferguson Act.67 Ultimately, the Court was unpersuaded, announcing in
a conclusory per curiam decision that the state legislation was sufficient
to displace federal regulation.68
Subsequent lower court cases have read National Casualty as estab-
lishing a broad scope for the general regulatory exemption. It is not nec-
rates by permitting insurers to write policies at "rates that are lower than the rates approved
by the commissioner provided the rates are not unfairly discriminatory." Id. at 1557. Under
Minnesota's regulatory system, the state insurance commissioner still retained the power to
prohibit unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive practices. See id. The Eighth
Circuit held that the partial rate deregulation had not lifted the McCarran-Ferguson Act bar
to federal antitrust scrutiny: although the state had "determined to promote price competition
by leaving to the insurers' competitive judgment the setting of workers' compensation insur-
ance rates below the allowable maximum," this policy "did not repeal the Commissioner's
supervisory authority over rate setting practices." Id. at 1558.
The court went on, however, to find that the plaintiffs had introduced sufficient evidence
in the trial court to trigger the boycott exception to the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Id. at 1561.
The parties settled for $50 million in January 1991, a resolution that received widespread
notice in the insurance press. See, e.g., Colleen Mulcahy, WC Insurers Settle Antitrust Suit,
Nat'l Underwriter, Jan. 28, 1991, at 3.
64 See text accompanying notes 65-73 infra.
65 357 U.S. 560 (1958).
66 Id. at 564.
67 See id. at 564. Reading between the lines, one can infer that the FrC's real objection
was that these state regulatory schemes were not being vigorously enforced.
68 See id.
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essary, for example, that the state statute or regulation deal specifically
with the practice in question; it is enough that the state "have a general
regulatory scheme governing the conduct of the insurance business."'69 It
is sufficient if the state regulatory scheme is "comprehensive and mean-
ingfully administered. ' 70
Nevertheless, although the scope of state regulation is quite broad,
state regulatory power will not displace competing federal regulation in a
number of circumstances. For instance, the mere fact that the state has
the power to regulate will not be sufficient to oust federal control if the
state has not chosen to exercise that power. Even if the state's decision
not to regulate reflects a deliberate state policy to leave a particular area
of commerce to free market forces, the McCarran-Ferguson Act might
not prevent the application of federal regulation to the field deliberately
abandoned by state authorities.
Furthermore, while state regulations need not be as stringent, or as
stringently enforced, as the competing federal law, they cannot be com-
pletely lacking in substance. The Court noted pointedly in National Cas-
ualty that the FTC "does not argue that the statutory provisions here
under review were mere pretense. ' 71 The clear implication was that if
the state had attempted to displace federal regulation by pretextual legis-
lation, the Court would have looked through the pretense and held the
federal law to be applicable.
Finally, state regulation will not oust federal control of activities en-
gaged in by insurance companies in other states. In Federal Trade Com-
mission v. Travelers Health Ass'n, 72 for example, the Supreme Court held
that the McCarran-Ferguson Act did not prohibit the application of the
Federal Trade Commission Act to allegedly false and deceptive state-
ments made in other states by an insurance company, even though the
company's domiciliary state purported to prohibit all deceptive acts and
practices by a domiciliary company regardless of location.73 As such,
despite the rather loose requirements for state regulation in the general
regulatory setting, some limits do exist.
69 Mcllhenny v. American Title Ins. Co., 418 F. Supp. 364, 369 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (holding
that practice of requiring new homebuyers to purchase mechanic's lien insurance was under
state regulation even though no state statute or regulation dealt specifically with the challenged
practice).
70 Schwartz v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 374 F. Supp. 564, 567 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
71 National Casualty, 357 U.S. at 564.
72 362 U.S. 293 (1960).
73 Id. at 298-99.
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2. Other Statutory and Constitutional Limits on the State's Power
to Regulate
Even if a state has "regulated" the business of insurance consistently
with the requirements of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, federal law still
applies if Congress has clearly indicated an intent to preserve the federal
law notwithstanding the McCarran-Ferguson Act.74 In the Act itself,
several federal laws expressly are preserved as applied to the business of
insurance, including the National Labor Relations Act, the Fair Labor
Standards Act, and the Merchant Marine Act.75
Aside from these statutes, express federal legislation overriding the
McCarran-Ferguson Act exemption is uncommon. In fact, Congress has
sometimes gone beyond what is strictly necessary in the other direction
by reiterating a regulatory exemption for the insurance industry in other
federal statutes. For example, Congress provided in the Employment
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)76 that "nothing in this [stat-
ute] shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of
any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities." 77 As courts
have recognized, the insurance exemption in ERISA is essentially a re-
statement of the McCarran-Ferguson Act's general regulatory exemp-
tion.78 Thus, even if Congress had not adopted the ERISA provision, the
McCarran-Ferguson Act probably would have ousted ERISA control
over state-regulated insurance activities.
Congress also considered the intersection between state and federal
regulatory authority in the Comprehensive Environmental Response
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA).79 CERCLA expressly pre-
empts state insurance laws which restrict the formation of certain risk-
retention pools or purchasing groups,80 but provides that "nothing in this
subchapter shall be construed to affect either the tort law or the law gov-
erning the interpretation of insurance contracts of any state."8 As such,
CERCLA generally retains the McCarran-Ferguson Act exemption
outside the narrow setting of risk-retention pools.
Thus far, we have considered statutory limitations on the regulatory
power of states under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. A number of consti-
tutional limits on the states' power to regulate the conduct of insurance
74 See 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1988).
75 See id. § 1014.
76 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
77 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1988).
78 The ERISA exemption is interpreted in pari materia with the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 48-51 (1987) (interpreting ERISA "sav-
ings clause" by reference to factors which define "the business of insurance" under the Act).
79 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. I 1990).
80 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9673-9675 (1988).
81 42 U.S.C. § 9672(a) (Supp. 1992).
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companies also have been articulated over the years.82
To take the most obvious example, a state could not engage in racial
discrimination through its insurance regulation, at least not unless the
discrimination was supported by a compelling state interest. Nor could a
state interpose regulation without giving the regulated party such rights
to procedural due process as might be required under the federal Consti-
tution. For the most part, however, these explicit protections for individ-
ual liberty are obvious and have not generated extensive litigation.
More problematic is the constitutional question of the geographic or
jurisdictional reach of state regulatory power-its legislative jurisdiction.
Because the insurance business is effectively nationwide in scope, one
state's efforts to regulate that business often generate ripple effects in
other states. This problem is particularly pronounced in the case of in-
surance, since the insurance contract itself is intangible, and it is often
impossible to locate any defined "situs" for the contract rights in ques-
tion.83 In addition, the sheer weight of state insurance regulation sug-
gests that this field should be the single most fertile breeding ground for
cases involving principles of legislative jurisdiction.
Legislative jurisdiction cases focus on the power of a state under the
federal Constitution to apply its law to transactions or relationships
which may involve occurrences, parties, or rights located or arising in
foreign jurisdictions. The leading early precedent in this area is Allgeyer
v. Louisiana,8 4 involving an action by the State of Louisiana against a
Louisiana firm which obtained a policy of marine insurance which did
not comply with a Louisiana law regulating the marine insurance busi-
ness.8 5 The insurance contract had been obtained from a New York in-
surance company and had been consummated in New York; the only
acts which occurred in Louisiana were the mailing of a letter and trans-
82 Today, it is clear that states enjoy broad substantive powers to regulate the business of
insurance within their borders, subject however to constitutional protections for personal liber-
ties. The scope of state regulatory authority in this regard was more or less definitively estab-
lished even during the heyday of the Lochner Era. Even then, the Court upheld broad state
authority over the business of insurance as it was striking down a variety of other state at-
tempts to regulate business. See, e.g., La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U.S. 465 (1919) (uphold-
ing state regulatory power over insurance brokers); German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233
U.S. 389 (1914) (upholding Kansas rate regulation for insurance firms). Since that time, insur-
ance has continued to be viewed as a business "affected with a vast public interest." Prudential
Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 415-16 (1946) (citations omitted). The justification for
highly rigorous state regulation is thus beyond serious question under current constitutional
dogma.
83 The parties to the insurance contract may be domiciliaries of different states. In addi-
tion, the policy itself may have been negotiated across state or international lines, and subse-
quently may be assigned to parties in still other jurisdictions. Furthermore, because the
insured party or property is frequently mobile, the loss may occur in yet another jurisdiction.
84 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
85 See id. at 579.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
April 1993]
HeinOnline -- 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 33 1993
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[
mission of premiums by the insured to the insurance company.86
Given these minimal contacts between Louisiana and the transac-
tion, the Supreme Court held that the state's law could not be applied
consistently with the requirements of the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment.87 A citizen of a state, said the Court, has "a right to
contract outside of the State for insurance on his property-a right of
which state legislation cannot deprive him."' 8 This line of reasoning,
which focuses solely on the right of a citizen to engage in contracts under
the due process clause, would appear to invalidate regulation of intra-
state transactions as much as interstate transactions if taken literally, yet
the power of states to regulate insurance contracts within their borders
had been recognized by the Court in an earlier case.89 The Court re-
solved this problem by ipse dixit, namely:
[]t may be conceded that [the] right to contract in relation to persons
or property or to do business within the jurisdiction of the State may
be regulated and sometimes prohibited when the contracts or business
conflict with the policy of the State as contained in its statutes, yet the
power does not and cannot extend to prohibiting a citizen from making
contracts of the nature involved in this case outside of the limits and
jurisdiction of the State, and which are also to be performed outside of
such jurisdiction.90
Later courts applied Allgeyer expansively to limit a state's authority
to regulate insurance transactions in other states. In St. Louis Cotton
Compress Co. v. Arkansas,91 the Court considered the legality of an Ar-
kansas statute which taxed insurance premiums paid by out-of-state
property owners to out-of-state insurance companies, when the property
insured was located in Arkansas.92 The Supreme Court, per Justice
Holmes, had little difficulty invalidating the statute on the authority of
86 See id. at 580-81.
87 See id. at 589. The case is chiefly remembered today for its eloquent, if subsequently
repudiated, description of the activities falling within the realm of protected "liberty" under
the due process clause. See id. (observing that due process clause protects "not only the right
of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but
... the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them
in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling;
to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which
may be proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the pur-
poses above mentioned").
88 Id. at 591.
89 See Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648 (1895) (upholding California statute making it a
misdemeanor for a "person in [the] state" to procure insurance from a foreign insurance com-
pany which had not complied with California's bond-filing requirements), overruled on other
grounds by United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
90 Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 591.
91 260 U.S. 346 (1922).
92 See id. at 347.
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Allgeyer, holding that "[a] State may regulate the activities of foreign
corporations within the State but it cannot regulate or interfere with
what they do outside." a93 Rather than grounding its decision on broad
notions of substantive due process, however, the Court opined that the
parochial purpose underlying "the Arkansas tax manifests no less plainly
than the Louisiana fine a purpose to discourage insuring in companies
that do not pay tribute to the State."'94
The developing principle that states could not regulate insurance
transactions occurring outside their borders did not apply to situations in
which the state asserting regulatory jurisdiction was the insurance com-
pany's domiciliary state. Indeed, the courts always have recognized that
domiciliary states have broad regulatory authority-broad enough in
some cases to trump assertions of regulatory authority by the state in
which policyholders reside. A classic early case is Hartford Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Ibs.95 The insured had failed to pay an assessment on a mu-
tual life insurance plan, resulting in cancellation of the policy a few days
before his death. The beneficiary sued for the death benefits under the
policy in Minnesota state court, alleging that the assessment in question
was illegal since the company improperly had accumulated large excess
margins which enabled it to pay death benefits without assessment. 96
The insurer defended with a prior decree by the Supreme Court of its
domiciliary state, Connecticut, which had affirmed the company's right
to levy the assessment. 97 On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the
Connecticut decree was conclusive as to the rights of the policyholder,
even though the policyholder had not been a party to the action, since
the Connecticut courts had jurisdiction over "all questions relating to the
internal management of the corporation." 98
In Home Insurance Co. v. Dick,99 the insured (Dick), a citizen of
Texas, sued in Texas court on a contract of marine fire insurance issued
in Mexico by a Mexican company to a resident of Mexico to cover losses
in Mexican waters. 100 The insurer argued that Dick, an assignee of the
policy, had failed to bring suit within one year as required by the con-
tract.101 Dick successfully contended in state court that the time-bar
provision was ineffective under a Texas law which purportedly invali-
93 Id. at 349.
94 Id.
95 237 U.S. 662 (1915).
96 See id. at 673.
97 See id. at 666.
98 Id. at 671.
99 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
100 See id. at 402.
1 See id. at 403-04.
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dated contractual provisions cutting off certain rights of action.102 The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Texas statute constitutionally
could not be applied to bar the defense.103
In defining the limits on a state's legislative jurisdiction, the Court
explained that "[a] State may... prohibit and declare invalid the making
of certain contracts within its borders. Ordinarily, it may prohibit per-
formance within its borders, even of contracts validly made elsewhere, if
they are required to be performed within the State and their performance
would violate its laws." 104 The Court also noted that a state could pro-
hibit the enjoyment by persons within its borders of rights acquired else-
where which violate its laws or public policy, and in some cases could
refuse to aid in the enforcement of such rights.105 However, the Court's
holding plainly implies that a state cannot apply its laws to invalidate a
contract which has no connection with the forum other than the fact that
it was assigned to a party residing in that state.
In John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Yates,106 an insured
obtained a life insurance policy in New York on the basis of material
written misrepresentations about his health.107 Soon after the policy was
issued, the insured died. His beneficiary moved to Georgia and sued to
recover the death benefit in the courts of that state. The insurance com-
pany set up the misrepresentation as a defense, but the beneficiary alleged
that the insured truthfully had reported his medical condition to the
agent, who had not recorded the information in the application.108 This
defense was good under Georgia law but not under New York law.10 9
On appeal, the Supreme Court declared that the Georgia courts were
required to respect the New York law under the full faith and credit
clause of the Constitution.' 10 This outcome can be explained by the fact
that all the legally significant events occurred in the State of New York.
In Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commis-
sion, I " the Supreme Court held that the full faith and credit clause nev-
ertheless permitted a state to apply its own law to determine the legal
consequences of accidents occurring within the state, even if the acci-
dents involved relationships previously established in other states.112 In
102 See id. at 405.
103 See id. at 407.
104 Id.
105 See id. at 410.
106 299 U.S. 178 (1936).
107 See id. at 179.
108 See id. at 179-80.
109 See id. at 181.
11o See id. at 183.
111 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
112 See id. at 503-04.
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Pacific Employers, a Massachusetts employee of a Massachusetts em-
ployer was injured while detailed temporarily to the employer's Califor-
nia facility. The employee sued the employer's California workmen's
compensation carrier and invoked the benefits of the California work-
men's compensation statute, which were more generous than those avail-
able under the Massachusetts statute.113 The insurance company defend-
ed on the grounds that the California courts were required to give full
faith and credit to the Massachusetts statute.114
In concluding that the California court could apply the California
statute consistently with the full faith and credit clause, the Court ob-
served that
in the case of statutes, the extra-state effect of which Congress has not
prescribed, as it may under the constitutional provision, we think the
conclusion is unavoidable that the full faith and credit clause does not
require one state to substitute for its own statute, applicable to persons
and events within it, the conflicting statute of another state, even
though that statute is of controlling force in the courts of the state of
its enactment with respect to the same persons and events.I 15
Because California had a valid legislative interest in the bodily safety and
economic compensation of employees injured within its borders, the
Court concluded that the California courts were free to apply California
law to the occurrence, even though Massachusetts law would have ap-
plied if the events had taken place in that state.' 16 Moreover, the case
appeared to establish the principle that the state in which the key events
giving rise to the legal dispute occur always has legislative jurisdiction to
apply its law in litigation in that state's courts.
In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague,1 7 the Court considered a bene-
fits claim brought in Minnesota court, arising from a Wisconsin insur-
ance policy which covered an accident that occurred in Wisconsin
involving only Wisconsin residents.' 18 The Minnesota Supreme Court
held that Minnesota law, which permitted a beneficiary to "stack" the
uninsured motorist coverage clauses on separate automobiles to increase
coverage limits, applied in the case.' 19
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed in a plurality opinion. Declaring
that the constitutional analysis was fundamentally the same under the
due process clause and the full faith and credit clause 12 0-a point that
113 See id. at 497-98.
114 See id. at 499-500.
115 Id. at 502.
116 See id. at 503.
117 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
118 See id. at 305-06.
119 Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 43, 49 (Minn. 1979).
120 See Allstate, 449 U.S. at 308 & n.10.
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had been in some doubt-the plurality stated that if the state whose law
was being applied "has had no significant contact or significant aggrega-
tion of contacts, creating state interests, with the parties and the occur-
rence or transaction," the application of that state's law would be
inconsistent with the Constitution. 121 If, on the other hand, the state had
sufficient contacts such that "choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor
fundamentally unfair,"1 22 then the state constitutionally could apply its
law. 123
In sum, while this line of cases does not establish any clear-cut rule
for state legislative jurisdiction over the insurance business, it would ap-
pear that the states have considerable constitutional leeway in regulating
insurance transactions with significant interstate contacts. The cases in
which the Supreme Court has invalidated state legislative jurisdiction
represent extreme situations, in which a state has extended its regulatory
grasp to transactions which had only marginal contacts with that state.
However, as long as there exist sufficient minimum contacts between the
state and the transaction in question, the state constitutionally may apply
its law. This is so even if one or more other states also possess legislative
jurisdiction.
Our conclusion that the Constitution imposes only minor con-
straints on the extraterritorial application of state insurance regulation
raises the question of why the states have not engaged in internecine reg-
ulatory war in an attempt by each to apply its law to the widest possible
range of practices. Several factors could explain the surprisingly peaceful
conditions in state insurance regulation, notwithstanding the potential
for regulatory conflict which is built into the constitutional structure.
First, the states have a long history of orking through organizations
such as the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) to
devise regulations that accommodate the legitimate regulatory concerns
of the different states involved. These multistate organizations have op-
erated as effective checks against the states' otherwise operative incentive
121 Id. at 308.
122 Id. at 313.
123 Id. at 312-13. However, the decision in Allstate, despite its broad language, does not
resolve completely the constitutional questions because it enjoyed the assent of only a plurality
of the Court. Justice Stevens concurred only in the judgment, articulating as the relevant
constitutional standard the proposition that "the [Full Faith and Credit] Clause should not
invalidate a state court's choice of forum law unless that choice threatens the federal interest in
national unity by unjustifiably infringing upon the legitimate interests of another State." Id. at
323 (Stevens, J., concurring in the result).
The three dissenting Justices (Powell, Burger, and Rehnquist) agreed with the plurality
that a state's application of its law should be invalidated "only when there are no significant
contacts between the State and the litigation." Id. at 332 (Powell, J., dissenting). In the view
of the dissent, however, the contacts with Minnesota were so minimal as to fail even this
"modest check on state power." Id. at 332 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 68:13
HeinOnline -- 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 38 1993
THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT OF 1945
to apply their own laws to interstate transactions. Federalism also en-
sures that state insurance regulators will be aware that failure to devise
workable strategies for interstate accommodation increases the risk of
federal intervention.
A second reason for the lack of interstate regulatory war is that the
insurance business is amenable to relatively straightforward allocations
of jurisdictional responsibilities among state regulators. Simple adminis-
trative ease has lead states quite naturally to assign to the state of domi-
cile the principal responsibility for solvency regulation, subject to the
power of other states to bar out-of-state insurers from writing policies in
the state if the out-of-state firm is considered to present unacceptable
risks to policyholders in the state. Regulation of insurance policies can
be roughly, but effectively, allocated on the basis of the location of the
insured. Regulation of the relationship between agencies and insurance
companies can be committed to the state in which the agency is located.
Regulation of advertising and other trade practices can be undertaken by
the state in which the advertising or trade practices take place. This allo-
cation is not perfect by any means, and in many situations, especially in
the case of commercial lines, may not identify unambiguously a primary
regulator. For most purposes, however, these rules of thumb quite effec-
tively determine which state should take the lead in regulating a particu-
lar transaction or practice.
Third, the McCarran-Ferguson Act itself has tended to inhibit regu-
latory conffict among the states. In Federal Trade Commission v. Travel-
ers Health Ass'n,124 the Supreme Court invalidated an attempt by an
insurance company's domiciliary state to displace federal regulation of
practices occurring in other states by adopting legislation purporting to
regulate the activities of the domiciliary company in other states.125 The
Court stated that the "state regulation which Congress provided should
operate to displace.., federal law means regulation by the State in which
the [practice] has its impact." 126 Thus, while the case did not directly
address the constitutional constraints on state action, it discouraged vig-
orous attempts by states to export their laws because it suggested that
such state laws would be ineffective to trump otherwise superseding fed-
eral regulations.
Although these rule-of-thumb allocations of state regulatory author-
ity have proven remarkably stable and successful historically, there are
some signs of potential breakdown in state cooperation in the area of
antitrust regulation. California's Proposition 103127 applied state anti-
124 362 U.S. 293 (1960).
125 See id. at 297-98.
126 Id. at 298-99.
127 1988 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 103 (West).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
April 1993]
HeinOnline -- 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 39 1993
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[
trust rules to insurance companies-rules that California officials con-
sider to be more stringent than the corresponding federal laws.128
Moreover, California's attorney general has taken the position that "it
does not matter where the [conduct creating liability] takes place. You
cannot comply with California's antitrust laws by breaking them in an-
other state or country. If the effects are felt in California, California law
applies."12 9 If Proposition 103 is enforced as strictly as these comments
suggest, the result could be the exportation of California's stringent anti-
trust rules to regulate the conduct of insurance companies nationwide, on
the theory that such conduct has "effects" in the California market. It
remains to be seen whether the California initiative will disrupt the sys-
tem of interstate cooperation in insurance company regulation.
C. The Model of State Regulation Created by
the McCarran-Ferguson Act
Having outlined the ways in which the Constitution and federal and
state statutes allocate jurisdiction over the insurance industry as between
the states and the federal government, we are now in a position to formu-
late a general theory about the dynamic structure of this system of regu-
latory federalism. In this Section we contrast three models of insurance
regulation within a federal system: the state rate regulation model, the
concerted withdrawal model, and the race-to-the-bottom model.
While this examination might appear somewhat removed from the
concrete regulatory world explored above, the answers provided here are,
in fact, vital in assessing whether the current roles of the federal and state
governments under the McCarran-Ferguson Act need to be revamped.
Indeed, whether specific proposals for reform currently under considera-
tion would be desirable hinges on which of these models one believes best
represents the scheme of regulatory federalism created by the McCarran-
Ferguson Act.
The first regulatory model, the "state rate regulation" model, de-
scribes the likely consequences of state action which affirmatively sets
rates for insurance products. It should go without saying that state in-
surance regulators have no foolproof means of determining the rates that
would be set for insurance products by an efficient private market when
they go about establishing rates-either by direct administrative control
or by deference to industry rating bureaus. Because the market price
that would prevail in the absence of rate regulation is impossible to deter-
mine, the administratively determined rates are very likely to be either
128 See Joanne Wojcik, California Antitrust Rules Anger Insurance Industry, Bus. Ins.,
May 21, 1990, at 3, 11.
129 Id.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 68:13
HeinOnline -- 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 40 1993
THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT OF 1945
too high (i.e., above market-clearing rates), or too low (below market-
clearing rates).
Consider first the scenario in which rates initially are set too low. If
the initial rate set by the commission were below the point of reasonable
profit, insurance firms would begin to withdraw coverage in the state. 130
These withdrawals would not be part of any conspiracy to elicit regula-
tory favors but simply would reflect the fact that the less efficient firms
cannot operate at a profit under the applicable regulations. The with-
drawals, in turn, would induce protests by policyholders and, eventually,
provide a reason for the insurance commission to raise rates.
If, on the other hand, the rate initially set were too high, the natural
corrective effect of withdrawals would not be present. No firms would
leave the market. There are, to be sure, several natural checks to exces-
sively high rates. Insurance firms are likely to engage in nonprice compe-
tition, thus dissipating some of the excess profits, and eventually high
prices are likely to induce consumer complaints. In general, however,
the dynamics of the market would appear to result in rates above market-
clearing levels in situations where rates are set administratively.
The effect of all this is that in an environment of state rate setting,
insurance rates will tend, on average, to rise above market-clearing levels.
Because rates will tend to be higher than those that would prevail in an
efficient market, consumers will have access to less insurance and will
have to pay more for insurance when they get it. Insurance firms, on the
other hand, will tend to earn above-market returns on their activities,
although these rents will be somewhat dissipated by nonprice
competition.
Different considerations apply if we posit the existence of aggressive,
well-organized consumer interests in the state. These groups may be able
to obtain rate rollbacks and even reductions of rates below market-clear-
ing levels. The natural response of the less efficient firms in the industry
then would be to withdraw from the state in order to avoid continued
losses. Thus, if firms can withdraw without incurring additional losses,
the impact of consumer groups is likely to be temporary: firms in the
state's market may find some of their wealth expropriated, but in the
long run the effect of withdrawals will be to drive rates back up to or
beyond market-clearing levels.
Recent experience in several states, however, suggests a possible ad-
ditional factor for consideration. If a state can impose a sufficiently high
"exit fee" or tax on firms wishing to withdraw from the state, then the
130 Withdrawals occur today; a prominent recent example is the decision by seven large
companies to leave the Massachusetts automobile insurance market in order to escape that
state's rate-setting system. See Henry Stimpson, Massachusetts Mirage?, 50 Ins. Rev. 36, 36
(1989).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
April 1993]
HeinOnline -- 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 41 1993
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
withdrawal option may not be feasible even for a firm which is operating
below its cost, if the present value of the losses associated with the tax
exceed the present value of the losses associated with continued opera-
tion in the state. Recent pro-consumer statutes-such as California's
Proposition 103 and the omnibus Texas statute--have included exit taxes
of various sorts.1 31 If a state can effectively neutralize the withdrawal
threat, it may be able to expropriate the wealth of shareholders-espe-
cially shareholders of out-of-state firms 132-for the benefit of policyhold-
ers in the state.
We believe that the state rate regulation model presents the most
accurate picture of the dynamics of regulatory federalism in the insur-
ance industry. It predicts that, aside from the matter of rates, the regula-
tory system is unlikely to display any systematic favoritism for insurers
and against policyholders as a result either of systematic withdrawals or
of interstate competition for charters. It further predicts that the busi-
ness of insurance is likely to be conducted in a relatively economically
efficient manner in states without rate regulation.
In states with rate regulation, however, the model predicts that rates
will either equal or exceed market-clearing levels in most cases. How-
131 The Texas legislation, for example, requires insurers to file a withdrawal plan and obtain
approval from the insurance commissioner before leaving the market, bars a firm from re-
entering the state for five years after withdrawal from the market unless the commissioner
approves an earlier reentry, and requires a substantial notice period before termination of
agency agreements. See Jaclene Fayhee, Texas Reforms Pass by Big Margin, Nat'l Under-
writer, June 3, 1991, at 1. The California law did not prohibit automobile insurers from exit-
ing the market entirely, but did severely restrict the power of firms selectively to exit the
market by canceling policies. See Cal. Ins. Code § 1861.03(c) (Deering 1992); Calfarm Ins.
Co. v. Deukmejian, 771 P.2d 1247 (Cal. 1989).
132 One recent study documents significant negative stock price effects surrounding the time
of the adoption of Proposition 103. See Roger M. Shelor & Mark L. Cross, Insurance Firm
Market Response to California Proposition 103 and the Effects of Firm Size, 57 J. Risk & Ins.
682 (1990). When the data were disaggregated to distinguish between insurers with heavy
California involvement and non-California insurers, however, the study found no significant
impact for the in-state firms and large statistically significant negative responses for the out-of-
state firms. While the authors of the study postulate that the effect reflects differences in firm
size, an equally plausible explanation is that firms with heavy involvement in California are
able to exercise political influence in order to receive relatively more favorable regulatory treat-
ment than firms with only a small California presence.
The inference that Proposition 103 and similar programs might be used as instruments for
in-state favoritism is reinforced by actual events. In California, for example, the current insur-
ance commissioner has declared that income from investments outside of California will be
included in the California rate base, thus subjecting out-of-state firms to the possibility of
multiple counting on their out-of-state investment income. See Joanne Wojcik, New Regulator
Freezes Rates under Prop. 103, Bus. Ins., Jan. 14, 1991, at 1. In New Jersey, a measure
adopted in March 1990 required automobile insurers to assume $1.4 billion of the debt of the
state's Joint Underwriting Association, see Gastel, supra note 60, at 11; the result was to ex-
propriate the wealth of company shareholders located all across the country for the benefit of a
class of New Jersey motorists.
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ever, in states where two factors coalesce-active, organized, and endur-
ing consumer political groups and significant exit fees on withdrawals-
the result may well be the opposite, namely, sustained below-market
rates.
We now turn to a competing model, the concerted withdrawal
model. Under one scenario, a deterioration of regulatory standards
could occur where insurance companies threaten to leave states en masse
unless the states adopt regulations which help the insurance industry, but
hurt consumers. Faced with this kind of threat, the states would capitu-
late to the insurance industry's demands on the theory that having some
insurance available, even on inadequate terms, is better than having none
at all. The result would be regulation that inadequately protects consum-
ers and unjustifiably enriches insurance companies.
Contrary to the assumptions of the concerted withdrawal model,
however, the industry's ability to implement this sort of concerted action
under present conditions is very limited. If the insurance business in a
state is profitable at the time of the threat to leave, the firms that leave
will sacrifice these profits as well as their business goodwill by departing.
Moreover, if the business is profitable some firms will not leave, knowing
that the departure of competitors will leave a rich market for them to
exploit. The low barriers to entry in insurance also suggest that start-up
firms will be established quickly to pick up the market share that the
existing firms have abandoned.
The scenario of an industry threat to leave for the purpose of ex-
torting benefits at the expense of consumers accordingly is unrealistic
unless the industry itself is highly organized for concerted action with
effective sanctions against firms that refuse to cooperate. There is little
evidence to suggest that an effective threat of group withdrawal could be
organized today, except in unusual market settings, if the purpose were
to extort benefits rather than to leave a market which had truly become
unprofitable. As such, the concerted withdrawal model does not offer
sufficient explanatory force as applied in the insurance regulation setting.
A third model of regulatory federalism in insurance markets, the
race-to-the-bottom model, draws on an analogy to corporate law regula-
tion. In the corporate context, the competition of states for corporate
charters (and the tax revenues and other income that corporate charters
bring in) has been said to stimulate a "race to the bottom" in which
states vie with each other to offer the menu of regulations most desired
by corporate managers, even though in doing so they permit managers to
engage in egregious abuse of shareholder interests. 133 As applied in the
133 The race-to-the-bottom theory is most prominently associated with Professor William
Cary, see William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 53
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insurance setting, states might compete to become the domiciles of insur-
ance firms in order to obtain the resulting taxes, jobs, and other benefits;
in order to attract insurance firms to their borders, they would therefore
offer a regulatory regime which served the interests of insurance firms
while harming those of policyholders.
Whatever its merits as a description of corporate law,134 the race-to-
the-bottom theory is not convincing as applied to insurance regulation.
As an initial matter, the model neglects to consider the effect of policy-
holder choice in insurance markets. If an insurance firm domiciled in
State A offers a product permitted under the law of State A which has
features inimical to consumer welfare, that product is not likely to fare
well in competition with more desirable products offered by other com-
panies. Constrained by consumer choice, insurance companies are not
likely to demand legal regimes which permit them to abuse consumer
welfare. Even if such regulatory regimes exist, insurance companies are
not likely to take advantage of them.
Moreover, with respect to policy terms, it is not possible for a firm
to export costs to policyholders located in other states as it is possible, for
example, for a corporation chartered in one state to export the costs
of pro-management rules to shareholders located in other states. As de-
scribed above, regulation of policy terms is similarly subject to the con-
trol of the state in which the insurance customer is located.1 35 Thus,
even if a firm's state of domicile allowed its insurance firms to engage in
egregious or abusive practices toward policyholders, the state in which
the policyholder is located is not likely to do so.
Exportation of costs theoretically is possible in the case of insurer
solvency regulation, as opposed to regulation of policy rates and provi-
sions, but insurance companies do not have a strong incentive to induce
their domicile states to promulgate excessively lax solvency regulations.
On the contrary, the larger, established insurance companies which hold
political power in a given state are likely to prefer quite stringent sol-
vency regulation. Stringent solvency regulation can operate as a barrier
to entry for new competition. For example, if substantial capital is re-
quired to open a new insurance company in the state, fewer new compa-
nies will be formed. Additionally, the established firms in the industry
are likely to prefer relatively stringent capital regulation in order to bol-
ster the reputation of their domicile state as a reliable regulator of sol-
vency. Such a reputation for the regulator redounds to the benefit of
firms in the state by providing credible signals of their own solvency and
Yale L.J. 663 (1974).
134 For our own contribution to this debate, see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller,
Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 469 (1987).
135 See notes 84-94 and accompanying text supra.
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good business repute. As such, while it is true that some states might
attempt to attract insurance company charters by offering lenient sol-
vency regulation, the consequence would be to draw the worst-capital-
ized and most failure-prone firms, while driving well-capitalized firms
away to other states. Moreover, other states would likely bar firms
chartered in the low-regulation state from writing policies within their
borders if such firms were deemed to present excessive insolvency risks.
The regulatory reach of the states over insurance markets13 6 also
suggests that each state will control the most important features of insur-
ance transactions which occur within its borders. One practical impact
of these overlapping regulatory regimes is that they likely remove any
incentive for large firms to move to states with lenient, anticonsumer reg-
ulations. To realize economies of scale, large firms need to use the same
forms, policies, and procedures in all the states in which they operate.
Therefore, if one state is particularly stringent, the large firms might ad-
just their entire business operations to comply with the requirements ap-
plying in the single stringent state. There tends to be a one-way ratchet
for large firms in the direction of complying with more stringent regula-
tions. But according to the race-to-the-bottom theory, it is exactly these
large firms which are likely to move their domiciles in order to take ad-
vantage of more lenient legal regimes. Smaller firms are not likely to do
so because the transaction costs of moving exceed whatever benefits they
could obtain from doing so. Accordingly, large insurance firms are not
likely to demand particularly lenient legislation or to respond to state
inducements to change domiciles in order to obtain favorable treatment.
Finally, in the case of insurance regulation, unlike general corporate
regulation, there exists an elaborate mechanism for cooperation and com-
munication among the state regulatory bodies. The practical necessity of
state insurance solvency regulators to work together provides powerful
disincentives to any state to initiate a competition in laxity. Such antiso-
cial behavior likely would be met by retaliation from other state regula-
tors, which could impose significant costs on any state regulator which
sought to poach on other states' domains.
For all these reasons, the regulatory pattern in the insurance indus-
try does not appear to be structured in such a way as to induce a race to
the bottom. Not surprisingly, there appears to be very little movement of
insurance firms away from their states of domicile, and firms-even the
very largest firms-have usually remained in the states in which they
were initially chartered. Moreover, no convincing evidence suggests that
the states in which the largest insurance companies are domiciled-New
136 See text accompanying notes 74-129 supra (describing jurisdictional reach of state
regulation).
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York, New Jersey, Illinois, Connecticut, Massachusetts, California, and
others-have engaged in any sort of competition in laxity; on the con-
trary, these states appear to be among the more stringent insurance regu-
lators nationwide.
In sum, the failings of both the concerted withdrawal and race-to-
the-bottom models suggest that the state rate regulation model is the
most appropriate description of the dynamic functioning of insurance
markets within our system of regulatory federalism. The model predicts
that, aside from the matter of rates, the regulatory system is unlikely to
display any sustained favoritism for insurers and against policyholders as
a result of either systematic withdrawals or interstate competition for
charters. It further predicts that the business of insurance is likely to be
conducted in a relatively economically efficient manner in states without
rate regulation. In states with rate regulation, however, the model
predicts that rates will either equal or exceed market-clearing levels in
most cases. However, in states where two factors coalesce-active, or-
ganized, and enduring consumer political groups and significant exit fees
on withdrawals-sustained, below-market rates may result.
II
RECONCEIVING THE FEDERAL ROLE UNDER THE
MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT
Because the state rate regulation model provides the best framework
to evaluate the system of insurance regulation created by the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, we can draw several tentative conclusions about the desir-
ability of federal regulation in a number of specific settings. The analysis
presented thus far suggests that federal regulation is not generally needed
as a corrective to systematic anticonsumer bias in the existing structure
of insurance regulation. The analysis here also suggests that state rate
regulation should be abandoned. Moreover, we may infer that antitrust
regulation should be administered so as to enhance the efficiency of mar-
ket forces in setting insurance rates. Finally, the analysis implies that
administrative rate setting is likely to result in systematically skewed re-
sults-rates that are either too high or, where consumer groups are pow-
erful and exit fees are imposed, too low. This suggests that federal
preemption might be useful in order to remove the unnecessary overlay
of state rate regulation and to ensure that rates are set by market forces.
In this Part, we examine the rationales behind the antitrust exemption,
solvency regulation, and regulation in light of the model developed in
Part I, concluding that the current regulatory regime is generally ade-
quate but suggesting certain specific reforms.
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A. The Antitrust Exemption
We now address the McCarran-Ferguson Act's antitrust exemption.
It should be observed at the outset that the McCarran-Ferguson Act does
not provide a safe harbor against scrutiny under state antitrust laws.
Historically, many states have exempted the business of insurance from
their own antitrust laws as well, so that the practical effect of the Act was
to protect the industry against antitrust scrutiny of any sort. In recent
years, however, states have begun to apply their own antitrust laws with
greater vigor. As of year-end 1990, the insurance industry was, for prac-
tical purposes, subject to full antitrust scrutiny under state law in twenty-
eight states. 137 Although merely being subject to a state's antitrust law
does not necessarily mean that an insurance firm would be scrutinized as
vigorously as it would if federal law applied, it is evident that state regu-
lators are increasingly favoring the use of their own antitrust laws to
control anticompetitive behavior by insurance firms.138
The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides a partial exemption from fed-
eral antitrust law and in so doing stands in some tension with basic prin-
ciples of competition that structure the vast majority of economic
activities in the United States. As the Supreme Court has observed, the
national policy favoring free competition and disfavoring cartels is
"pervasive," "fundamental," and "essential to economic freedom." 139
Against the backdrop of such a fundamental policy, any exemption from
the federal rule against private collusion in price setting must overcome a
substantial burden of persuasion.
After examining the various rationales advanced to support the fed-
eral antitrust exemption, this Section looks at the scope of the exemption
as applied by the courts. It then addresses the probable impact of apply-
ing federal antitrust scrutiny to the industry.
L Rationales for the Exemption
a. Sharing Information. The most cogent argument for the anti-
trust exemption is that it facilitates the economically efficient sharing of
information, and accordingly permits insurance companies to evaluate
risk and price insurance accurately.14° Industry rating bureaus thus are
137 See Edward J. Muhl, A Ceasefire in the War of Words, Best's Rev. (Property/Casualty
Ed.), Dec. 1990, at 28.
138 One potential political effect of this increased use of state antitrust laws may be the
mitigation of the industry's traditional opposition to McCarran -Ferguson Act reform, on the
theory that many of the benefits of the Act are already lost if the industry is subject to vigorous
antitrust scrutiny under state law.
139 FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 112 S. Ct. 2169, 2176 (1992).
140 See Daniel J. McNamara, Toward a New Environment, Best's Rev. (Property/Casualty
Ed.), June 1990, at 53 ("One primary justification for these activities within our competitive
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seen as serving the socially efficient goal of accurate pricing, and are not
considered to have been designed to facilitate any sort of anticompetitive
price fixing. Even where private rating bureaus have small anticompeti-
tive effects, however, the social costs of the reduction in competition are
presumed to be outweighed by the social efficiencies which rating bu-
reaus make possible.
This argument starts with the observation that faulty pricing of in-
surance products causes harmful economic distortions and inefficiencies.
If rates are set too low, the effect will be to subsidize activities by in-
sureds, resulting in social costs of excessive activity levels. Excessively
low rates, moreover, will cause insurance firms to be unprofitable, result-
ing in the departure of some firms from the industry and the under-provi-
sion of insurance by those that remain. Shortages will occur, and some
parties will find themselves unable to obtain insurance at all. If rates are
set too high, on the other hand, insurance firms will prosper, but policy-
holders will pay too much; thus socially desirable activities will be dis-
couraged. Some customers will be unable to afford insurance at all, and
will be forced either to abandon their activities or to self-insure under
circumstances where an insurance contract could have been obtained if
the product had been priced correctly. High rates would also reduce the
incentive to operate efficiently that insurance firms otherwise would face
in an unregulated pricing environment; accordingly, waste and ineffi-
ciency in the provision of insurance services will result.
Cooperation among insurance companies is necessary to achieve ac-
curate pricing in the industry, especially for property/casualty lines.
Overall, insurance premiums reflect the provider's evaluation of the
probable costs of paying claims, as well as other costs of doing business
and a reasonable provision for profit. But, in the case of property/casu-
alty lines, the cost of claims payable in the future is difficult to assess at
the time the policy is written, because both the probability of an event
occurring, and the severity of the event if it does occur, are difficult to
evaluate. Proper evaluation of risk requires extensive sampling of past
occurrences of the events insured against, as well as analysis of the his-
torical sample in order to predict losses in the future.
This sampling and analysis can only be accomplished, so the argu-
ment goes, through cooperative efforts among insurers. Cooperation
thus serves two principal purposes. First, it makes historical loss data
available in a sufficiently large sample to provide a high degree of statisti-
cal reliability in the analysis. In the absence of cooperation, each firm
might hold its own historical loss data as a form of proprietary informa-
capitalistic system is that the pooling of data is necessary to determine adequate premiums and
to achieve more equitable premiums by individual risk classification.").
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tion, and it would be difficult for any insurance firm, except the very
largest companies, to base loss predictions on a reliable sample of past
experience. 141 Second, cooperation achieves economies of scale because
the sampling and analysis need only be done once, by an industry-wide
rating bureau, rather than many times within individual firms. For both
of these reasons, under this argument, cooperative rating bureaus are
necessary to achieve accurate insurance pricing, at least in the property/
casualty insurance business.
The strength of the economic argument for information sharing de-
pends substantially on the types of information being shared. Histori-
cally, rating bureaus have provided three general types of information to
firms in the industry: historical loss costs, prospective loss costs, and
advisory rates. Of the three, historical loss costs clearly present the
strongest case, particularly as respects historical loss data for property/
casualty insurers.142
The argument for sharing information within the industry is persua-
sive as applied to historical loss data for property/casualty insurers. It is
true that property/casualty firms might obtain broadly based historical
loss data even if they were barred from directly sharing data with com-
petitors. An independent consulting firm, not in the insurance business,
could purchase historical loss data from many firms, compile the data,
and then sell it back to assist firms in their pricing decisions. The trans-
action costs associated with such a third-party arrangement might be
high, however, and firms might not have confidence in the data or analy-
sis provided by the consulting company. They also might not be sure
that the data provided to the consulting company by their competitors
are fully accurate. Problems such as these might make information-shar-
ing arrangements within the industry itself the most efficient means of
gathering and compiling historical loss data for property/casualty lines.
The economic justification for sharing historical loss data may also
extend to prospective loss costs-the analysis of data after it has been
compiled. Insurance rating bureaus offer not just historical cost data, but
also prospective loss cost analysis that projects future costs. Although
the details of prospective analysis may differ across rating bureaus, 1 43
141 See Francis Achampong, The McCarran-Ferguson Act and the Limited Insurance Anti-
trust Exemption: An Indefensible Aberration?, 15 Seton Hall Legis. J. 141, 155 (1991).
142 The argument is somewhat less plausible for life and health insurance firms, since mor-
tality and morbidity statistics are widely available from a variety of public and private sources
outside the insurance industry.
143 There are two principal nationwide rating bureaus in the property/casualty area: the
Insurance Services Office, Inc. (ISO), which serves most property/casualty lines, and the Na-
tional Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI), which serves workers' compensation
lines. See notes 144-47 and accompanying text infra (discussing rating bureaus). A variety of
smaller rating bureaus provide related services. See id.
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there appear to be two key elements in most systems.
First, a rating bureau may attempt to take account of the fact that
payments often are not made for years or even decades after the policies
in question have expired. Loss development analysis measures changes in
historical incurred losses resulting from late reported claims and changes
in dollar values for claims already reported. 144 Loss development analy-
sis utilizes new information to project future costs of claims on past poli-
cies. The argument for sharing information about future policy losses for
claims on past policies is quite strong. Such information sharing avoids
duplication of effort, and would not easily occur in the absence of collab-
orative activity because much of the data on which the loss development
analysis is based is proprietary information in the control of individual
companies. Accordingly, we believe that insurance companies should be
able to engage in collaborative loss development analysis without incur-
ring potential liability thereby under the federal antitrust laws.
Second, while loss development analysis is used to estimate what the
ultimate losses will be for claims associated withpast policies, trend anal-
ysis addresses the question of the losses associated with future policies. 145
Trend analysis takes account of significant economic or legal changes
that are likely to affect losses on future policies, including the inflation
rate, changes in the law, and increases or decreases in the frequency of
claims. The effect of these changes is to make historical, developed loss
costs an unreliable measure of losses on future policies. Trending is
designed to correct for these distortions.
Although the argument for collaborative efforts in loss development
analysis is strong, the argument is somewhat weaker in the case of trend
analysis. There is usually no problem of proprietary information for
many aspects of trending analysis; provided that the raw data are avail-
able, anyone can analyze them. For example, the inflation rate is readily
available from a wide range of sources, and economic science has yet to
develop a reliable technique for estimating the rate of future inflation.
The argument for trending is considerably stronger with respect to cate-
gories of data, such as developments in claim frequency or judgment
amounts, that remain the property of individual companies if not shared
in collaborative activities.
Although conducting trending analysis through a rating association
avoids duplication of effort, this kind of analysis is not an exact science.
The presence or absence of a trend is often a matter of judgment, as is the
evaluation of whether a given trend will wax, wane, or remain constant.
144 See Insurance Services Office, Inc., Using the Past to Predict the Future: Historical
Data, Loss Development and Trend 7 (1989).
145 See id. at 10.
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Industry-wide reliance on the trending analysis of a rate-making bureau
might actually end up being inefficient because if the trending proves to
be inaccurate the result would be industry-wide mispricing, whereas if
many firms performed their own analyses the combined contribution of
the different assessments might produce a more informed market price.
Moreover, smaller firms would not be precluded from obtaining trending
information in the absence of an industry-wide rating bureau; presum-
ably consulting firms would be ready and willing to conduct trending
analysis and sell the results to numerous companies.
Trending analysis also may include projected administrative costs of
claims resolution. These costs include the costs of processing claims as
well as anticipated litigation costs from claims that are not resolved at
the administrative level. There appears to be little economic rationale for
the provision by rating bureaus of predictions about future costs of
claims processing and litigation. Each individual firm is best equipped to
predict its own expenses, which vary across firms because of a multitude
of factors. Lumping administrative and litigation expenses together into
a broad-based average, developing the information to account for pre-
dicted future expenses, and supplying the analysis back to the industry
appear to provide little information of real value.
Given all these considerations, although the question is a close one,
cooperative efforts at trending analysis probably should be permitted
from an efficiency standpoint, although the legal system should be dili-
gent to ensure that trending is not used as an aid to the establishment of
standardized rates among competing firms.
Rating bureaus have traditionally incorporated all of their data
analyses into final advisory rates. 146 These advisory rates are based on
the bureaus' analyses of historical loss costs and prospective loss costs,
but include a loading for operating expenses and profit as well. We see
no justification for the provision of general expense information by a cen-
tralized industry rating bureau as an incident to the development of final
advisory rates. There is no reason to suppose that a rating bureau would
be in any better position to predict future costs of operation than would
an individual insurance company. Costs of operation vary across firms
for many different reasons. Overhead, marketing, employee compensa-
146 It should be noted in this regard that the major industry rating associations are moving
towards limiting the types of information they supply to firms in order to reduce their poten-
tially anticompetitive effects. Both the ISO and the NCCI are shifting from advisory rates
towards a focus on historical loss data. See note 143 and accompanying text supra (discussing
ISO and NCCI). The ultimate effect of these changes may be to move the industry in the
direction of free competition over rates. See Kevin Thompson, McCarran-Ferguson Repeal
and ISO's Advisory Rate Ban: A Chance for Compromise?, 17 N. Ky. L. Rev. 373, 388-89
(1990).
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tion, and many other costs vary from firm to firm; there is no reason
therefore to believe that any particular figure for such expenses is opti-
mal. Because each firm is the best judge of its future expenses, the rating
bureaus provide little information of economic value when they derive
average expense figures to be used in the process of setting advisory rates.
Nor, in our view, is there any economic justification for a rating
bureau's use of a standardized provision for profit in the derivation of
advisory rates. The profit which a given firm can expect to earn in a
competitive marketplace is a function of many factors, some firm-
specific, some industry-specific, and some cutting across industries. In-
surance firms receive no information of economic value-other than in-
formation that might facilitate anticompetitive pricing policies-when
centralized rating bureaus set forth standardized profit margins for the
industry as a whole.
The least justification inheres in the promulgation of the final advi-
sory rates themselves. Advisory rates provide no real information to
firms beyond what the firms could provide for themselves, other than
information about the price the firm is expected to charge and what price
other firms will charge. There is no basis for supposing that firms are
unable to set their own rates, once they have the necessary cost informa-
tion. Nor is there any plausible argument that rate setting by an industry
bureau avoids an inefficient duplication of efforts by the individual firms.
Firms in every competitive industry set their own prices, yet we do not
imagine that the research and analysis that go into these pricing decisions
represent some sort of inefficient duplication of effort that should be
avoided by reference to a single pricing bureau. Insurance is no different.
The fact is that advisory rates serve little function other than discourag-
ing competition. 147
Overall, then, our analysis suggests that the economic argument in
favor of the use of pooled information for purposes of setting price
depends upon the nature of the information at issue. The argument is
persuasive with respect to historical loss data and developed loss costs,
weaker, but still persuasive, with respect to trend analysis, and unpersua-
sive as applied to final advisory rates.
The fact that sharing of data within the industry is economically
efficient in limited circumstances, however, does not necessarily translate
147 For the argument that widespread use of advisory rates contributed to the insurance
crises of the 1980s, see Jay Angoff, Insurance Against Competition: How the McCarran-Fer-
guson Act Raises Prices and Profits in the Property-Casualty Insurance Industry, 5 Yale J. on
Reg. 397, 406-08 (1988). For a different and more plausible explanation of the insurance crisis,
see George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modem Tort Law, 96 Yale L.J. 1521,
1563-82 (1987) (arguing liability insurance crisis was caused by judicial compulsion of exces-
sive levels of third-party insurance for victims).
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into an argument for retaining the McCarran-Ferguson Act's antitrust
exemption. As will be seen below,148 existing doctrine under federal anti-
trust law would allow firms in the industry to share data freely, without
fear of antitrust liability, in many cases where such data sharing is eco-
nomically desirable. Nevertheless, we will argue that, on balance, the
case for repealing the Act's antitrust exemption is not established, pro-
vided that existing law adequately polices against cooperative activities in
the industry that pose serious threats to competition.
b. Standardizing Policy Forms. A second argument in favor of the
antitrust exemption is that it allows the use of standard policy forms,
which have traditionally been promulgated by the industry's rating bu-
reaus. 149 Standardized policy forms may be said to serve several social
goals. First, they arguably facilitate comparison shopping by consumers,
because with a standard form in place, a consumer need only shop
around
on the basis of price. If forms were not standardized, on the other hand,
the consumer would have a difficult time comparing policies, because the
lower price of one policy might be more than offset by the reduced cover-
age offered by that policy. Without standardized forms, consumers
would have to wade through the fine print of each policy to assess the
effective costs of the various deductibles, exclusions, and exemptions.
This is time consuming for the consumer; but, more importantly, the
consumer lacks a methodology for determining the actual economic
value of particular items of coverage, since that value can be determined
only through the sorts of actuarial analyses that are now conducted by
firms and rating bureaus. In the absence of effective comparison shop-
ping, the industry is likely to be less efficient and less competitive.
Another important economic advantage of standardized forms is
that they facilitate the compilation of data necessary for the analysis of
risk categories and severity. In the absence of form standardization, it
would be difficult to compile an adequate statistical data base on which
to base risk assessments.
Finally, language in standardized forms comes to reflect judicial and
administrative decisions and becomes more precise over time. Other
things being equal, it is desirable for all parties that the terms of the
policy be precise and determinate in order to reduce the frequency of
148 See notes 160-73 and accompanying text infra.
149 The actual degree of standardization imposed by the rating bureaus depends on the
nature of the policy. Policies are least standardized in commercial lines, where the size of the
policy and the uniqueness of the risks involved often result in individual negotiation of impor-
tant policy terms. Personal lines such as homeowners', automobile, and health insurance are
more standardized.
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coverage disputes. The need for clear terms is particularly compelling in
the insurance industry due to the danger of opportunistic behavior in
contract interpretation by both the insured and the insurer at the time a
claim is made.
These are significant advantages. In our view, the advantages are
sufficiently great as to justify a wide range of cooperative behavior within
the industry intended to develop and refine standardized forms.
However, the advantages of standardized forms do not necessarily
justify the establishment of industry-wide uniform policies that exclude
the use of forms or policies other than the standardized models: the stan-
dard forms should be suggested only, and should not be exclusive of stan-
dard forms proposed by others, of firm-specific forms, or of individually
negotiated forms. If it is unacceptable for insurance companies or groups
to impose standard forms on the rest of the industry, granting power to a
rating bureau to enforce or compel the use of standardized forms clearly
goes beyond these limited economic justifications. As such, the ultimate
decision as to which forms prevail in the industry can and should be left
to market forces.
c. Preserving Competition. Two related arguments offered in favor
of the antitrust exemption focus on the effects that federal antitrust regu-
lation has on the competitiveness of the insurance market. The first such
argument posits that smaller firms "may be forced to go out of business
entirely or be absorbed by larger companies"' 50 if the antitrust exemp-
tion were repealed. If insurance firms are not allowed to share informa-
tion, so the argument goes, smaller firms will suffer disproportionately.
Only larger firms will be able to assess future losses accurately because
their own operations will give them access to a large data set of historical
costs and because the expenses of trending and analysis can be spread
over their large policyholder base. Thus, in the absence of information
sharing, the insurance industry would be forced to restructure, with
costly and disruptive departures of smaller firms from the market. The
end result, according to this argument, would be an industry concen-
trated in a few large and potentially oligopolistic firms.
There is probably some truth in the prediction that repeal of the
antitrust exemption would harm smaller firms. But the principal "harm"
from applying the antitrust laws to the insurance industry would not be
to smaller firms per se, but to inefficiently managed firms that cannot
compete when prices are set at competitive, market-clearing levels. Most
of these inefficient firms may well be some of the industry's smaller firms,
150 See Achampong, supra note 141, at 167 (arguing that inability to share data would affect
smaller companies' ability to set adequate and competitive rates, thereby risking their insol-
vency); see also H.R. 9 Hearings, supra note 10, at 48 (statement of Sen. Roy Woodall, Jr.).
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not only because smaller firms are likely to be less efficiently managed in
some cases, but also because most firms in the industry are small relative
to the ten or twenty largest firms. But many small firms are likely to
survive and even prosper under a regime of truly competitive pricing.
Economies of scale in the insurance industry, while they exist, are not
nearly as pronounced as in many other industries. 151 Some states, such
as Illinois, have operated with competitive pricing for many years now,
and there has been no major shakeout among the smaller firms. The
testimony from the banking industry suggests that a smaller firm can do
well, even in head-to-head competition with industry giants, if it is well-
managed and maintains good customer relations.152
Finally, there is no valid economic reason to maintain small firms in
operation, simply because they are small, if they are inefficiently man-
aged. Propping up badly managed or inefficiently organized firms harms
consumers by subsidizing inefficient producers at the expense of efficient
ones; it rewards poor performance rather than good performance; and it
reduces the efficiency of the insurance function within the economy as a
whole. A regulatory regime in which insurance firms were not allowed
to fail would be undesirable as a matter of public policy.153 Application
of the antitrust laws to the insurance industry would no doubt increase
the incidence of insurance company failures at the margin, but failure is
the inevitable result of a price system which offers great benefits to con-
sumers of insurance products and to the economy as a whole.
The other competition-based argument offered in favor of the anti-
trust exemption focuses on the lack of concentration in the insurance
industry, and posits that repeal of the McCarran-Ferguson Act would
reduce competition and harm the interest of consumers. Proponents of
the exemption first observe the large number of insurance providers in
the marketplace-by one account, nearly 6000 life, health, and property/
151 See Christopher Dauer, Size No Object in Insurer Expenses, Nat'l Underwriter (Prop-
erty & Casualty/Risk & Benefits Mgmt. Ed.), Oct. 29, 1990, at 31 (reporting study showing
that "the size of an insurance company is not a major determinant of efficiency"); Randall
Geehan, Returns to Scale in the Life Insurance Industry, 8 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 497, 513
(1977) (finding only weak evidence of statistically significant returns to scale in the Canadian
life insurance industry). But see generally Neil A. Doherty, The Measurement of Output and
Economies of Scale in Property-Liability Insurance, 48 J. Risk & Ins. 390 (1981) (finding
empirical evidence of significant economies of scale in Canadian property-liability insurance
markets).
152 See, e.g., B. Frank King, Upstate New York: Tough Market for City Banks, Econ. Rev.
of the Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta, June/July 1985, at 30 (noting success of smaller banks in
upstate New York versus branches of larger New York City banks). The banking analogy is
not exact, however, because even the smallest banks could offer accounts backed by federal
deposit insurance, which is something that smaller insurance firms cannot do.
153 See A. Dale Tussing, The Case for Bank Failure, 10 J.L. & Econ. 129, 146 (1967) (argu-
ing that allowing bank failures could result in better societal resource allocation).
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casualty companies and 400,000 agents. 154 This market is also extraordi-
narily unconcentrated in virtually all product lines: for instance, in the
property/casualty line, "no single firm has more than 10% of the na-
tional market, and the 10 largest companies account for less than 40 per-
cent of the premium volume."1 55
Given this dramatic lack of concentration, the proponents of the
antitrust exemption conclude that the industry is obviously highly com-
petitive,156 suggesting that federal antitrust scrutiny is not needed to
enhance competition. Rather, they suggest that federal scrutiny would
actually reduce competition in the industry, because the inevitable effect
would be to drive many of the smaller to mid-sized firms from the
market, concentrating the industry and facilitating anticompetitive
behavior. 157
This argument is not well-taken. The fact that the industry is un-
concentrated does not necessarily establish that it is competitive; on the
contrary, the opposite may be true. Above-market pricing can still occur
in an unconcentrated industry if there is either a highly effective cartel in
operation, or if prices are set above market-clearing levels by government
fiat. Until fairly recently, for example, the nation's approximately 12,000
commercial banks operated under governmentally mandated price con-
trols which limited the amounts banks could pay in interest to depositors
and prohibited the payment of any interest at all in the case of checking
accounts.1 58 These price controls, combined with other regulations, per-
mitted many smaller banks to survive and therefore contributed to a
highly unconcentrated industry. But it would strain credulity to suggest
that the banking industry was fully competitive at the time; it could not
have been fully competitive since banks were prohibited from competing
on the basis of price in their most important market. 159 In the insurance
industry, the prices of contracts with policyholders has been regulated
similarly through government price controls. The pervasive presence of
these price regulations suggests that the large number of insurance com-
panies might reflect government price protection rather than vigorous
154 See H.R. 9 Hearings, supra note 10, at 49 (statement of S. Roy Woodall, Jr.). The
numbers have also been increasing: in 1979, there were 1895 U.S. life insurance firms; in 1989,
there were 2350. See American Council of Life Ins., 1990 Life Insurance Fact Book 103
(1990) [hereinafter ACLI Fact Book].
155 Insurance Info. Inst., 1990 Property/Casualty Insurance Facts 10 (1990).
156 See, e.g., Muhl, supra note 137, at 28, 30 (stating that most property/casualty carriers
are small or medium-sized firms with little market share); Franklin W. Nutter, The Flawed
Consumer Agenda, Best's Rev., Mar. 1991, at 28-29 (arguing that current system has fostered
industry with large number of sellers, each with small market share).
157 See Muhl, supra note 137, at 30; Nutter, supra note 156, at 28-29.
158 See Geoffrey P. Miller, The Future of the Dual Banking System, 53 Brook. L. Rev. 1, 2-
3 (1987).
159 See id.
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competition.
It may well be that application of federal antitrust scrutiny to the
insurance industry will lower profit margins in the industry and drive
some firms out of business. However, as we have illustrated, the loss of
these firms represents a social benefit, since almost by definition the firms
forced to leave the industry or merge with other providers would be less
efficient. The industry is so highly unconcentrated that the departure of
even large numbers of firms would not cause significant concerns about
competition.
2. The Effects of Repealing the Antitrust Exemption
The advisability of the antitrust exemption under the McCarran-
Ferguson Act also must be evaluated in light of the fact that many of its
purported benefits could be achieved under conventional exceptions to
the federal antitrust laws. These doctrinal exceptions include the rules
permitting cooperative sharing of information, the Noerr-Pennington ex-
emption for cooperative lobbying activities, and the state action doctrine.
After discussing these conventional exceptions, this Section also exam-
ines briefly the boycott exception to the antitrust exemption to determine
whether its increasingly expansive interpretation would permit the occur-
rence of anticompetitve behavior in the first instance.
a. Cooperative Research. As we have seen, one of the principal jus-
tifications for the antitrust exemption is the bona fide need of insurance
companies to share information regarding risks and to cooperate in the
development of standardized forms. 60 The possibility that federal anti-
trust laws would prohibit or seriously impede these cooperative activities
would be a good reason for retaining some of the protections from anti-
trust scrutiny. As currently administered and enforced, however, the
federal antitrust laws may not seriously impair the ability of insurance
firms to engage in a considerable amount of bona fide information shar-
ing or cooperative research in the identification and quantification of
risks.
The federal antitrust laws have, for many years, been administered
with sensitivity to the legitimate needs of industry participants to share
certain types of information. 161 As the Department of Justice observed
160 See notes 140-47, 149 and accompanying text supra.
161 See generally AEI Study, supra note 12, at 52-55 ("[T]he antitrust laws clearly permit
the joint performance of certain functions, including the formulation of a classification system
and statistical plan, and the collection, compilation, and dissemination of past loss and expense
data. On the other hand, the projection of future rates, or any large component thereof, would
likely fall within the prohibitions of the Sherman Act.").
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in a 1977 study, The Pricing and Marketing of Insurance,162 existing anti-
trust law does not prevent competing businesses from undertaking joint
activities involving economies of scale, and which realistically cannot be
undertaken by competitors acting alone, so long as the activities in ques-
tion do not unnecessarily harm competition. 163
In 1980, the Justice Department again emphasized the permissibil-
ity, under federal antitrust law, of research projects conducted through
trade associations or industry joint ventures. 164 Such joint ventures are
evaluated under a rule of reason standard, and are upheld against anti-
trust attack if they have a legitimate business purpose, do not hamper
competition, and promise benefits to the public. 165 As a practical matter,
joint research ventures rarely are challenged under the Sherman Act,166
particularly if the industry involved is not highly concentrated. 167
Finally, Congress recognized and codified the public policy objective
of protecting bona fide cooperative research from antitrust scrutiny in the
National Cooperative Research Act of 1984 (NCRA).1 68 The statute
provides that in any action under the federal antitrust laws,
the conduct of any person in making or performing a contract to carry
out a joint research and development venture shall not be deemed ille-
gal per se; such conduct shall be judged on the basis of its reasonable-
ness, taking into account all relevant factors affecting competition,
including, but not limited to, effects on competition in properly de-
fined, relevant research and development markets. 169
A "joint research and development venture" is defined to include:
theoretical analysis, "the systematic study of phenomena or observable
facts," "the extension of investigative findings or theory of a scientific or
162 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Report to the Task Group on Antitrust Immunities: The Pricing
and Marketing of Insurance (1977).
163 Id. at 146-76.
164 See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Guide Concerning Research Joint Ventures (1980).
165 Cf. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1979)
(joint activities which arguably reduce costs and facilitate efficient marketing of products will
be reviewed under a rule of reason under antitrust laws).
166 See ABA Antitrust Section, Antitrust Law Developments 52 (2d ed. 1984).
167 Cf. United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969) (high degree
of concentration in corrugated container industry presented grounds for suspicion of exchange
of price information among competing firms). See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Economics
and Federal Antitrust Law 110-24 (1985) (discussing application of federal antitrust law to
cooperative information-sharing activities).
168 Pub. L. 98-462, 98 Stat. 1815 (1984) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305 (1988)). The
NCRA has yet to be applied to the insurance industry, so that the statute's technical implica-
tions for insurance are still undefined.
169 15 U.S.C. § 4302 (1988). In addition to providing that joint research and development
activities be reviewed on a rule of reason standard, the NCRA limits the damages available in
private antitrust actions based on such activities, see id. § 4303, and permits awards of attor-
neys fees to prevailing defendants if a claim is found to be frivolous, unreasonable, without
foundation, or in bad faith, see id. § 4304(a).
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technical nature into practical application for experimental and demon-
stration purposes," and "the collection, exchange, and analysis of re-
search information." 170 Protected activities do not include exchanges of
information among competitors that are "not reasonably required to con-
duct the research and development that is the purpose of such ven-
ture,"1 71 nor do they extend to conduct or agreements which involve
production or marketing as opposed to research and development (other
than agreements relating to the marketing of the proprietary research
information itself). 172
Because the NCRA subjects cooperative research to a rule of reason
antitrust analysis, it does not operate as a complete safe harbor for bona
fide information sharing. Nevertheless, its practical effect would be
much the same as a safe harbor, for once the analysis is phrased in terms
of a rule of reason, all the economic justifications for a given activity are
admissible into evidence.173
In sum, it is virtually inconceivable that a bona fide information
pooling venture for historical loss costs in the insurance industry would
be subject to a successful antitrust challenge. It also is unlikely that ex-
isting antitrust law would reach legitimately procompetitive information-
sharing activities such as the preparation, dissemination, and filing of
policy forms and classifications, participation in joint underwriting or
pools for residual risks, sharing of information relating to fraudulent
claims, or certain types of shared research and inspections for the pur-
pose of risk classification.
This analysis suggests that even the repeal of the antitrust exemp-
tion would not necessarily bar economically justifiable types of coopera-
tive activities that economic theory suggests should be undertaken.
Never-
theless, enough uncertainty exists in this area to warrant retaining the
existing exemption, provided that it is interpreted to permit vigorous an-
titrust enforcement against those cooperative activities that harm or
threaten to harm the competitive process.
b. Lobbying. Another type of collaborative industry activity that
would survive the repeal of the antitrust exemption is political lobbying
170 Id. § 4301(a)(6). The term "joint research and development venture" also specifically
includes the establishment and operation of facilities for the conduct of research, and the con-
ducting of such a venture on a protected and proprietary basis. Id.
171 Id. § 4301(b)(1).
172 See id. § 4301(b)(2). Also excluded are agreements restricting use of inventions or de-
velopments not developed through a research and development venture, or unreasonably regu-
lating participation by a party in other research and development activities. See id.
§ 4301(b)(3).
173 See H. Hovenkamp, supra note 167, § 4.4 at 124-34.
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protected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. 174 Cooperative activities by
insurance firms for the purpose of sharing information or even develop-
ing proposed rates easily can be characterized as a form of petitioning
state regulators in an attempt to influence state policy, and accordingly
might be protected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Thus, even if
the antitrust exemption were repealed, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine
would offer another potential bulwark to protect collective rate-making
activities. 175
It is unlikely, however, that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine would be
extended so far as to immunize private activity which fixes prices or
otherwise restrains competition, even if its ostensible purpose is to influ-
ence government action. The leading case addressing this issue is United
States v. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference,176 in which the Fifth
Circuit held that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine did not immunize rate-
setting activities by private motor carrier rate bureaus, even when the
purpose of such activities was to develop joint rates to be filed with state
regulatory bodies. 177 Thus, while the Noerr-Pennington doctrine will
protect a range of cooperative action between insurance companies for
the purpose of inducing political action, it is unlikely to interfere with
valid state efforts to regulate anticompetitive rate-setting activities.
c. State Action. The final and most important doctrinal exception
to the antitrust laws is the "state action" immunity of Parker v. Brown.1 78
174 See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127,
136-38 (1961) (holding that Sherman Act did not prohibit group of railroads from collectively
lobbying legislature, regardless of anticompetitive purpose); United Mine Workers v. Pen-
nington, 381 U.S. 657, 669-70 (1965) (same); California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Un-
limited, 404 U.S. 508, 510-11 (1972) (holding plaintiffs could not establish as a matter of law
that damages had resulted from defendants' efforts to lobby Secretary of State).
175 For an analysis concluding that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine protects a substantial
range of collective conduct by the insurance industry, see Robert W. Hammesfahr, Antitrust
Exemptions Applicable to the Business of Insurance Other than the McCarran -Ferguson Act:
the State Action Exemption and the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 54 Antitrust L.J. 1321, 1329-
31 (1985).
176 672 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1982), aff'd en banc, 702 F.2d 532 (1983), rev'd on other
grounds, 471 U.S. 48 (1985).
177 The court distinguished between the rate-setting activities, which were not protected
under Noerr-Pennington, and the actual activity of presenting rates to the state commissions or
of seeking regulatory permission to engage in joint activities. See id. at 477 ("While the joint
efforts of the bureaus to secure legislation or commission regulation permitting collective
ratemaking procedures would clearly fall within the ambit of Noerr protection, inasmuch as it
would seek to influence policy, collective action to determine the rates which the bureaus de-
sire the commission to approve is not of the same genre.").
178 317 U.S. 341 (1943). For a thorough discussion favoring state action immunity, see
generally Merrick L. Garland, Antitrust and State Action: Economic Efficiency and the Polit-
ical Process, 96 Yale L.J. 486 (1986).
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Based on "principles of federalism and state sovereignty,"' 179 the state
action doctrine exempts anticompetitive activities from antitrust sanction
when such activities are "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed
as state policy," and the policy in question is "actively supervised" by the
state itself. 180 The first prong of this test is satisfied even if the state does
not directly require the conduct in question, so long as it has evinced an
"intent to establish an anticompetitive regulatory program."' 81 The sec-
ond prong is satisfied if "state officials have and exercise power to review
particular anticompetitive acts of private parties and disapprove those
that fail to accord with state policy. ''182
The degree of state involvement in rate setting necessary to trigger
state action immunity is not clear for the obvious reason that the McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act itself prevents the litigation of test cases to establish
the boundaries of the doctrine in this context. Nevertheless, recent cases
offer a glimpse of the rules that would likely be applied if the insurance
industry were placed under the existing scheme of federal antitrust
regulation.
In Federal Trade Commission v. Ticor Title Insurance Co., 83 the
FTC challenged alleged rate setting by title insurance companies for title
insurance and examination. While the respective state insurance com-
missioners possessed the power to investigate the reasonableness of the
rates and to veto them if unreasonable, they had conducted only minimal
investigation and passively had allowed the rates promulgated by private
rating bureaus to go into effect.184 Nevertheless, the Third Circuit held
that such collective rate setting was protected by the state action doc-
trine. 185 The court noted that the states had adopted a clearly articulated
and affirmatively expressed policy to displace market rates, emphasizing
that the state commissioners had approved the filing of collective rates,
that the state statutes recognized the existence of private rating bureaus,
179 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 343 (1987).
180 California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. 445 U.S. 97, 105
(1980) (finding that California's mere authorization of price setting and enforcement of prices
established by private parties did not meet state action requirement) (quoting City of Lafayette
v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978) (opinion of Brennan, J.)).
181 Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 65 (1985).
Thus, where an administrative agency is statutorily required to establish "just and reasonable"
rates for an industry, the state action exemption protects collective rate making by firms if the
agency so permits. Id. at 63-65.
182 Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 101 (1988).
183 112 S. Ct. 2169 (1992).
184 See id. at 2174-75.
185 Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. FTC, 922 F.2d 1122, 1124-25 (3d Cir. 1991). Because it held that
the challenged activities were protected by state action immunity, the court did not address the
defendants' argument that their actions were protected by the McCarran-Ferguson Act. See
id.
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and that a federal court should defer to the reasonable interpretations of
state law by state administrative bodies. 186 The court further found that
the states had engaged in the requisite active supervision of collective rate
making187 by "demonstrat[ing] some basic level of activity directed to-
ward seeing that the private actors carried out the state's policy and not
simply their own policy. ' 188
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed. 189 Initially, the Court de-
termined that the level of state supervision over the rates in question had
failed to meet the minimum threshold for state action immunity, because
"[a]ctual state involvement, not deference to private price fixing arrange-
ments under the general auspices of state law, is the precondition for
immunity from federal law." 190 Furthermore, the Court explained:
Where prices or rates are set as an initial matter by private parties,
subject only to a veto if the State chooses to exercise it, the party claim-
ing the immunity must show that state officials have undertaken the
necessary steps to determine the specifics of the price-fixing or rateset-
ting scheme. The mere potential for state supervision is not an ade-
quate substitute for a decision by the State.1 9 1
Ticor therefore suggests that the courts will not be willing to read
the state action exemption very broadly in rate-setting cases. However,
even under the terms of Ticor, a substantial range of private activity in
the rate-setting area probably would qualify for state action immunity.
For instance, as long as state insurance regulators actually review the
filed rates for substance, require disclosure of information underlying the
rates, and require demonstration that the information justifies the filed
rates, it is likely that the collaborative activities of private parties in rate
setting (subject to administrative review and potential disapproval)
would
remain within the ambit of state action protection.
Ticor also supports the view that the state action doctrine applies
when the state affirmatively sets rates. When the rate setting is actually
conducted by the state itself, the existence of state action is not an issue.
Additionally, state action is probably present when a state requires that
insurers engage in collaborative rate setting through rating bureaus (or
similar mechanisms) and requires that the firms adhere to the rates so
established. A requirement of cooperative action constitutes a clearly ex-
186 See id. at 1129-40.
187 See id. at 1140.
188 Id. at 1139 (referring specifically to the activities of Montana, one of the states impli-
cated in this case).
189 Ticor, 112 S. Ct. at 2180.
190 Id. at 2176-77.
191 Id. at 2179.
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pressed state policy in favor of such activity, while the mandatory nature
of such a system satisfies the second prong of the state action test, namely
that the state actively supervise the private activity in question.
When the state does not affirmatively require collaborative rate set-
ting, but nevertheless permits it to occur, the cases suggest the following.
First, any statute that expressly authorizes rate setting by rating bureaus
or other collaborative mechanisms should be sufficient to protect the co-
operative activity under the state action doctrine if the state actively and
meaningfully supervises the rate-setting activities to ensure compliance
with the legislative goals. Second, even if a statute does not affirmatively
authorize collaborative rate setting, the state action doctrine probably
still would apply if the state insurance commissioner is empowered to
establish rates, and, pursuant to that authority, allows collaborative rate
setting under active and meaningful administrative supervision as an aid
to determining rates.
State action immunity probably would not be found if the state in-
surance commissioner did not actively and meaningfully supervise the
rate-setting activities of a private rating bureau to ensure case-by-case
compliance with the commands of the applicable legislation or regula-
tion. Furthermore, state action immunity probably would not apply in
states which operate under free-market rate-setting regimes, even if the
insurance commissioner permits collective rate-setting activities and re-
tains discretionary power to reject rates deemed discriminatory, exces-
sive, or inadequate. Such schemes would appear to reflect neither a
clearly expressed state policy to displace market forces nor sufficiently
active state supervision of the activities of private rating bureaus.
This analysis of the state action exemption suggests that a possible
reaction to the repeal of the antitrust exemption would be a demand by
insurance companies that state insurance codes be revised to ensure the
availability of state action immunity in a wide range of private rate-set-
ting activities. If successful, this strategy would ensure that industry par-
ticipants enjoy the maximum discretion to set their own rates consistent
with the doctrine of state action immunity. The Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Ticor, however, restricts the ability of private insurance compa-
nies to organize cartels without meaningful state supervision; and the
actions of insurance commissioners presumably would be subject to some
degree of political control to the extent that the commissioners actively
cooperated with a private cartel to fix rates to the detriment of insurance
consumers. Accordingly, the Supreme Court's current approach to state
action, which significantly prunes back the expansive interpretations of-
fered by a number of lower courts, is sufficiently well-defined and ad-
ministrable to obviate the need for special legislation defining the scope
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of state action in the insurance context. 192
d. The Boycott Exception. The practical scope of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act's antitrust exemption-and therefore the impact of any
congressional action repealing the exemption-depends crucially on the
interpretation given to the boycott exception. Under the Act, the general
antitrust exemption does not apply to "any agreement to boycott, coerce,
or intimidate, or act of boycott, coercion or intimidation." 193 If the boy-
cott exception is construed broadly, the antitrust exemption loses much
of its power to shield anticompetitive activities within the industry from
antitrust scrutiny. As in the case of other key phrases in the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, the boycott exception is susceptible to a variety of inter-
pretations yielding important differences in outcomes.
Read most narrowly, the boycott exception would apply only to the
principal abuse against which it appears to have been directed-the re-
fusal by insurance companies to deal with independent agents or other
insurance firms that engaged in rebating or other practices which firms
within the industry wished to deter.194 A broader reading would include
any concerted activities directed at competitors or customers which have
the purpose and effect of completely denying them the benefit of competi-
tion in "vital matters such as claims policy and quality of service." 195
A still broader interpretation would bar concerted activities by in-
surance firms which have the purpose and effect of limiting access by
customers, agents, or competitors to the benefits of competition in any
aspect of the insurance business, even if they do not altogether foreclose
market operation. This interpretation would allow firms to utilize coop-
erative rating bureaus to establish rates, but would deny them the power
to enforce such rates once they had been established.
The Supreme Court wrestled with these issues in the leading case of
St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Barry.196 The case involved an
alleged conspiracy by medical malpractice insurers to refuse to deal with
policyholders in a company which had altered its coverage from an "oc-
192 But see Achampong, supra note 141, at 152-55 (arguing that state action doctrine would
provide insufficient protection to the insurance industry in the absence of an antitrust exemp-
tion, because the close supervision requirement would require discarding open competition for
flex-rating or prior approval systems). Achampong's major concern, that in the absence of an
antitrust exemption insurance companies will not be able to share loss data, is treated at notes
141-45 and accompanying text supra.
193 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (1988).
194 This is the major abuse complained of in the legislative history. See, e.g., 91 Cong. Rec.
1485 (1945) (remarks of Sen. O'Mahoney).
195 St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 553 (1978). For an analysis that
advocates roughly this reading, see Joseph E. Coughlin, Losing McCarran Act Protection
Through "Boycott, Coercion, or Intimidation," 54 Antitrust L.J. 1281 (1986).
196 438 U.S. 531 (1978).
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currence" basis to a "claims made" basis. 197 The purpose of the alleged
conspiracy was to prevent policyholders from switching insurers in re-
sponse to the policy change.19 8 The defendant insurers argued, inter alia,
that the boycott exception did not apply to refusals to deal directed at
customers rather than competitors. 199 The Supreme Court rejected this
argument, holding that the exception "is not limited to concerted activity
against insurance companies or agents or, more generally, against com-
petitors of members of the boycotting group.' 20° The alleged practices
under review amounted to a boycott under the statute because they
"erected a barrier between St. Paul's customers and any alternative
source of the desired coverage, effectively foreclosing all possibility of
competition anywhere in the relevant market. '20 1
The Barry decision seemed to endorse the second interpretation of
the boycott exception set forth above, since it emphasized the fact that all
possibility of competition in the relevant market had been foreclosed.
However, it left a great deal unresolved because the presence or absence
of a boycott under Barry appeared to depend on a quantitative analysis of
the extent to which the concerted activity in question interferes with
competitive forces. 202 Activities such as those found to have occurred in
Barry, which completely foreclosed all possibility of competition any-
where in the market, were within the boycott exception, but the applica-
tion of the exception to activities which interfered with competition only
partially remained unclear.
The Supreme Court clarified the scope of the boycott exception in
another important recent case, Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Califor-
nia.20 3 California and other states challenged certain activities by major
insurers in the commercial general liability (CGL) insurance business.
The states claimed that the defendants had engaged in a pattern of coer-
cion in an attempt to force the Insurance Service Office (ISO)-an organ-
ization of insurance firms which promulgates standard contracts for the
property/casualty industry-to modify its standard CGL insurance
form.204 The complaint alleged that the defendants had refused to deal
with the old CGL form, thus effectively forcing the entire industry to
adopt the coverages favored by the defendants. 205 The consequence, ac-
cording to the complaint, was that certain forms of CGL coverage be-
197 Id. at 534-35.
198 See id. at 535, 552.
199 See id. at 546-51.
200 Id. at 552.
201 Id. at 553.
202 See id. (focusing on total elimination of competition).
203 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993).
204 See id. at 2897-99.
205 See id. at 2898.
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came unavailable.20 6
The Supreme Court held that the allegations in the complaints, con-
strued most favorably to the complainants, were sufficient to allege a
boycott within the meaning of the boycott exception and thus to with-
stand a motion to dismiss.20 7 The Court distinguished a boycott from a
concerted agreement as to terms. 20 8 Parties who agree to terms and then
refuse to deal with others except on those terms are engaged in carteliza-
tion, not boycott. The essence of a boycott, in the Court's view, is that
transactions not directly related to the targeted transaction are used as
leverage to achieve the end desired.2°9
The Barry and Hartford Fire Insurance Co. cases have interpreted
the boycott exception in such a way as to permit cooperative price-fixing
arrangements but to remove most, if not all, practical devices (short of
state action) for enforcing such agreements. For example, if insurance
companies agreed jointly on a price to charge for a particular policy pre-
mium, this in itself would not amount to a boycott under Hartford Fire
Insurance Co., since the agreement does not involve a refusal to deal on
matters collateral to the basic agreement. However, if the agreement in
addition included an arrangement whereby insurance companies that re-
fused to honor the price-fixing agreement were punished by some type of
collateral sanction, the arrangement would go beyond a concerted agree-
ment to terms because coercive pressure not directly related to the basic
arrangement would then be part of the understanding. Thus, while the
boycott exception does not subject collective agreements as to price or
policy forms to the federal antitrust laws, it makes it difficult for the
parties to an agreement to organize an effective system of sanctions to
penalize defections from a cartel once established.
For reasons already discussed, the arguments in favor of cooperative
activities by insurance firms do not justify coercive measures by industry
participants that force others to adhere to recommended terms or poli-
cies. The arguments in favor of cooperation have to do with the provi-
sion of information, not with coercing uniformity. Thus, the relatively
expansive interpretation of the boycott exception found in the recent
Supreme Court cases appears to represent sound social policy. Under
such an interpretation, the antitrust exemption for cooperative activities
generally seems less problematic than might otherwise appear, since the
antitrust laws are not precluded from policing against the application of
economic leverage to coerce compliance with cartel policies or prices.
206 See id.
207 Id. at 2895-2900.
208 Id. at 2912.
209 Id.
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3. Conclusions
As this Section has shown, the antitrust exemption of the McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act should be interpreted to enhance competitive forces in
the insurance industry, while not impairing the ability of industry mem-
bers to engage in socially desirable cooperative activities. Accordingly,
the boycott exception to the Act should be interpreted to police against
the danger of cooperation among firms to coerce others to charge uni-
form rates, use particular forms, or the like. For similar reasons, state
action immunity should be limited to situations in which the state has
actively and continuously regulated the activities in question.
The antitrust laws should not apply, however, to cooperative efforts
at sharing and analyzing historical loss cost or prospective loss cost infor-
mation. Likewise, it is important that firms in the industry have access
to standardized forms if they wish to use them. If legitimate activities
are threatened by the federal antitrust laws, it may be desirable to imple-
ment safe harbors expressly protecting activities where economic benefits
outweigh the possible dangers to competition.210 We believe that appro-
priately crafted safe harbors could address problems confronting the in-
dustry to the extent that the antitrust laws are made applicable to the
business of insurance in the future.211
In general, recent interpretations of the McCarran-Ferguson Act
have adopted reasonable constructions of the statute. Thus, we do not
believe the Act needs fundamental modification or repeal at this time. If,
however, the statute were to receive a judicial construction that inter-
fered with the power of the federal antitrust laws to police against threats
to competition within the industry, we would then recommend that Con-
gress consider repealing the immunity while at the same time providing
explicit safe harbors for economically efficient cooperative activities that
do not pose serious threats to competition-the sharing and cooperative
analysis of historical and prospective loss cost data and the cooperative
development of standardized forms.
B. Solvency Regulation
This Section considers the impact of the McCarran-Ferguson Act in
210 If a safe-harbor approach is adopted, the statute or legislative history should specify that
the express mention of certain safe harbors is not in derogation of other permissible coopera-
tive activities, the likely economic benefits of which outweigh the possible dangers to competition.
211 The safe-harbor approach discussed here resembles a number of recent proposals, in-
cluding those of the ABA's Commission to Improve the Liability Insurance System, which
recommended in 1989 that the antitrust exemption be repealed, subject to a limited authoriza-
tion "to engage in specified cooperative activity that is shown to enhance the competitiveness
of the industry." ABA, Report of the Commission to Improve the Liability Insurance System,
Recommendation 3.1(1) (1989).
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the area of state solvency regulation-arguably a more important aspect
of the statute than the better-known antitrust exemption.212 The ade-
quacy of state solvency regulation has recently come under attack from
many quarters. The House Energy and Commerce Committee's Sub-
committee on Oversight and Investigations held hearings on insurance
company insolvencies, and issued their findings in Failed Promises: In-
surance Company Insolvencies (popularly known as the "Dingell Re-
port").213 The General Accounting Office has also issued reports
criticizing the existing system of state solvency regulation. 214 Mean-
while, Public Citizen, a Ralph Nader-affiliated "public interest" group,
asserted in October 1990 that five of the top twenty property/casualty
firms might fail in the event of an economic downturn. 21 5 And while the
organization was subsequently forced to retract these charges with re-
spect to several of the named firms, 21 6 the widespread publicity still re-
duced consumer confidence in the solvency of the insurance industry as a
whole. Finally, congressional dissatisfaction with state solvency regula-
tion has generated proposed legislation,217 and even a few voices within
the industry itself have expressed a surprising openness to federal sol-
vency regulation.218
Yet despite the appearance of crisis created by such reports, a care-
ful examination of the actual facts in the insurance business indicates
that the industry is not experiencing a solvency crisis. While there have
been several widely publicized failures, most insurance firms are solvent
and well-capitalized. As such, the analogy to the banking industry's in-
solvency crisis is at best misleading, and at worst plainly false. More-
over, states are now proceeding aggressively to improve and strengthen
their solvency regulation, which was relatively well-designed before the
212 See Kimball & Heaney, supra note 26, at 2 (eliminating antitrust exemption "would
leave the most important part of the [McCarran-Ferguson] Act intact").
213 Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Com-
merce, Failed Promises: Insurance Company Insolvencies, H.R. Doc. No. 362-3, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1990). The House Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer Protection and Competi-
tiveness also held hearings on similar subject matter. See Life Insurance Solvency Issues, July
17, 1991: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer Protection and Competi-
tiveness, H.R. Doc. No. 361-58, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
214 The vigor of state closure policies comes under fire in General Accounting Office, Insur-
ance Regulation: State Handling of Financially Troubled Property/Casualty Insurers, Report
to the Chairwoman, Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer Protection and Competitiveness,
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, H.R. Doc. No. 361-58, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
215 See Editorial Comment, A Disservice to Public Citizens, Nat'l Underwriter, Nov. 26,
1990, at 16.
216 See id.
217 See text accompanying notes 254-66 infra.
218 The American Insurance Association (AIA), which represents larger insurance compa-
nies who hold about 40% of the market for commercial lines, has stated it is keeping an "open
mind" regarding federal solvency regulation. See Hall, supra note 12, at 109.
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current round of legislative changes. Also, since any proposal for feder-
alizing state solvency regulation must consider whether the federal gov-
ernment could do a better job at protecting policyholders, the shameful
failure of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board in preventing thrift indus-
try insolvency suggests there is little reason to believe that a federal
agency would do a better job. In short, the case for federal solvency
regulation is not persuasive.219
1. Current Solvency Conditions
In recent years, the insurance industry has faced significant strains
on its solvency. In many respects, the causes of instability in the insur-
ance business are similar to the problems plaguing the banking industry:
heavy investments in the most dramatically deflated commercial real es-
tate market since the Great Depression,220 and large stakes in junk bond
issues which have subsequently soured.221 According to one study, the
ratio of high-risk assets (junk bonds and troubled real estate invest-
ments) to total surplus (statutory surplus plus mandatory securities valu-
ation reserve) jumped from 91% in 1989 to 140% in 1990.222
Yet at the same time, it is unlikely that the insurance industry as a
whole will experience the sorts of catastrophic failures that occurred in
the thrift and commercial banking industries. One essential distinction
between these industries is that insurance firms are not constrained by
219 But see AEI Study, supra note 12, at 95 (recommending federal solvency regulation and
noting the "probable necessity for a federally established guaranty fund in the event of the
sudden, unpredicted demise" of insurance companies doing business under federal auspices).
It is worthy of note that AE's study was conducted well before the failures in the bank and
thrift deposit insurance systems and the reevaluation of deposit insurance which has followed
those financial disasters.
220 The actual number of firms with serious real estate problems is relatively small, how-
ever. As of April 1991, only about a dozen life insurance firms had mortgage problems and
defaults in excess of 40% of surplus. See Gil Marmol & John Shuck, Testing the Mettle of
Life Insurers, Best's Rev., Apr. 1991, at 16. These firms, however, include some of the major
companies in the industry. See id. The industry's overall investment in real estate has de-
creased steadily since 1966, when mortgages constituted 38.6% of the total assets of life insur-
ance firms, to only 19.5% in 1989. See ACLI Fact Book, supra note 154, at 94. Real estate
owned outright has remained close to 3% of total assets since 1960. See id. at 98.
221 Almost all investment in junk bonds was by the life insurance sector; casualty/property
firms did not buy large volumes of high-yield debt, and junk bonds represented only one per-
cent of total assets in 1988. See Russ Banham, Junk Jitters, 51 Ins. Rev., No. 4, Apr. 1990, at
10. Even in the life insurance sector, however, the number of firms with heavy exposure in
junk bonds is small, although involved firms are large. By April 1991, it was estimated that 37
life insurance companies, accounting for 16% of the industry's invested assets, had junk bond
portfolios in excess of 100% of surplus; 12 companies had junk bond portfolios in excess of
200% of surplus. See Marmol & Shuck, supra note 220, at 16. Overall, only 4.8% of the total
assets of life insurance companies are invested in junk bonds. See id.
222 See Frederick S. Townsend, High Risk Assets: 140% of Total Surplus, Nat'l Under-
writer, June 3, 1991, at 3.
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the restrictive asset rules that apply to banks and thrift institutions, and
thus they are better able to diversify their investment portfolios.223 Fur-
thermore, unlike banks and thrifts, insurance companies do not offer
risk-free investments that can be marketed nationwide and used to post-
pone the failure of fundamentally unsound institutions. Federal deposit
guarantees and the highly liquid nature of bank deposit accounts allowed
many banks and thrifts to expand their deposit bases and grow dramati-
cally in size, while at the same time investing the deposited funds in un-
sound or highly speculative ventures. Needless to say, many of these
fast-growing depository institutions subsequently have failed. However,
this strategy is not readily available to insurance firms because the insur-
ance product is neither as risk-free nor as liquid as bank certificates of
deposit. While some insurance firms in the 1980s did offer investment
vehicles such as annuity contracts and did attempt to grow quickly by
offering cheap premiums, this group represents only a small segment of
the market (although a large percentage of the insurance companies that
have failed). 224 Thus, even if insurance firms were inclined to adopt a
risky investment strategy, they could not leverage a federal deposit guar-
antee to expand indefinitely at the ultimate expense of the taxpayers.
Furthermore, the actual condition of the -insurance industry is no-
where near as troubled as that of the banking industry during the 1980s.
Although a few firms have failed, the failures have not been catastrophic
and have represented only a small percentage-less than one percent-of
the total firms in the industry.225 Additionally, some firms commonly
considered to have failed, such as Mutual Benefit Life and Monarch Life,
223 Many insurance firms are allowed to invest some of their portfolios in equity securities.
See ACLI Fact Book, supra note 154, at 83 (as of 1989, 9.7% of life insurance company assets
were held in corporate equity securities). Junk bonds in particular had less appeal to insurance
companies than they did, for example, to savings and loan institutions, because insurance firms
could seek high returns in equity markets, and the relatively strong stock market bolstered the
insurance industry's investment returns at a time when many junk bond portfolios were per-
forming badly.
224 The growth patterns of firms involved in some of the most prominent recent failures are
illustrative. Executive Life Insurance Co. of California grew from assets of approximately $4
billion in 1984 to approximately $13 billion in 1989, largely through the sale of annuity con-
tracts. See Best's Ins. Rep. (Life-Health) 751 (1990). Executive Life Insurance Co. of New
York grew from approximately $1.7 billion in assets in 1984 to approximately $3.9 billion in
1989. See id. at 755. The Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co. did not adopt a high-growth
strategy until shortly before its failure, with admitted assets growing from approximately $8.3
billion in 1984 to approximately $11.6 billion in 1989. See id. at 1523. However, Mutual
Benefit Life did appear to adopt a high-growth strategy after 1989, with individual life insur-
ance in force growing from $36.3 billion in 1989 to $67.3 billion in 1990, an increase of 85.4%
in a single year. See Jim Connolly, Larger Companies Showed Growth Across the Board,
Nat'l Underwriter, June 10, 1991, at S2.
225 See Ruth Gastel, Insolvencies/Guaranty Funds, Ins. Issues Update (Insurance Info.
Inst., New York, N.Y.), Aug. 1993, at 1.
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may not have been economically insolvent at the time of their closures
and may eventually pay creditors in full. 226 As such, these early closures
simply may reflect the fact that the insurance industry actually is han-
dling its problems more effectively than the banking industry did, since
early closure can prevent, or at least mitigate, creditors' losses.
Finally, the commercial real estate and junk bond markets have be-
gun to recover, and blue chip equity securities are trading at record
levels. The insurance industry also appears to have good access to new
capital, 227 and, on balance, it is unlikely-absent unforeseeable exoge-
nous factors such as a stock market crash, a new recession, or a natural
catastrophe-that the insurance industry will be subjected to an indus-
try-wide insolvency crisis over the next few years.2 28
2. State Solvency Regulation
State solvency regulation of insurance companies appears in three
forms: regulatory safety and soundness supervision, minimum capital
rules, and guaranty funds. While these regulations appear relatively
well-crafted to achieve their objectives, states are, in any case, currently
proceeding to strengthen them. The National Conference of State Legis-
latures established a task force on insurance solvency regulation in 1990
and announced that enactment of tougher laws would be a high prior-
ity.229 Meanwhile, the NAIC has implemented solvency accreditation
standards under which state regulators, to receive certification, must es-
tablish that they have adequate powers under state law and that they
226 See New Jersey Court Appoints Conservator of Troubled Mutual Benefit Life Insurance,
18 Pens. Rep. (BNA) No. 29, at 1240 (July 22, 1991); Jim Connolly, Penn Mutual Is Mon-
arch's New Manager, Natl Underwriter, June 24, 1991, at 29.
227 Stock firms can also raise equity capital by selling new securities on the market. Parent
corporations can and do infuse new capital into insurance subsidiaries. For example, Kemper
Corp. committed $1.8 billion in capital to back the operations of two life insurance subsidiaries
which had been downgraded by Moody's Investors Services, Inc. This guaranty came on the
heels of a prior injection of $125 million in additional capital. See Laurie Cohen, Kemper
Backs its 2 Life Units, Chicago Trib., July 28, 1991, at 3.
Mutual institutions, which have been among the hardest hit by recent economic condi-
tions, are increasingly considering demutualization (converting to stock ownership) as a means
of increasing capital. Leading this movement is the Equitable Life Assurance Society of the
U.S., which recently converted from a mutual to a stock institution, and which received a
commitment from an investor (the French insurance firm Groupe Axa, S.A.) to infuse $1
billion in new capital into the firm even before the planned public stock offering. See Susan
Pulliam, Equitable Life's Plan to Sell Stake Advances, Wall St. J., July 18, 1991, at A3.
228 A recent study of the industry by Professor Orin Kramer bears out these conclusions as
applied to property/casualty firms. See Orin Kramer, Insurance Info. Inst., Rating the Risks:
Assessing the Solvency Threat in the Financial Services Industry 35 (1991). Professor Kramer
finds that an industry-wide solvency crisis is improbable, even under pessimistic economic
assumptions, and concludes that property/casualty firms are relatively strong compared to
counterparts in other industrial sectors. See generally id.
229 See Gastel, supra note 225, at 1.
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have the necessary resources to enforce those powers. 230 The NAIC also
is evaluating state regulatory agencies under this program and may adopt
tougher regulations under which insurers in states failing to adopt the
NAIC's model insolvency laws could be penalized. 231 Finally, the NAIC
also has announced its own priorities for toughening solvency
regulation. 232
State insurance regulators monitor the safety of institutions under
their jurisdiction by means of site examinations and analyses of report
data. Insurance firms are required to file annual financial statements
with their regulators. State regulators examine the data through systems
developed by the NAIC,23 3 and the regulators conduct investigations in
greater detail if firms are identified as potential problems by the NAIC.
If these problems prove to be serious, insurance regulators take a series of
increasingly severe remedial actions, beginning with intensive audits or
private jawboning in minor cases, and proceeding to formal orders re-
quiring the firm to improve its solvency by increasing capital or restruc-
turing its investments or public remedial actions such as placing the
institution in conservatorship or rehabilitation in more serious cases.
The worst cases ultimately end up in receivership and liquidation.234
Every state has established a guaranty fund covering policyholders
in homeowner, automobile, and other property/casualty companies,235
and most if not all have similar programs in place for life and health
insurance companies. 236 Most states also have workers' compensation
funds. Other lines such as disability, ocean marine, mortgage guaranty,
and title insurance are less than fully covered. Reinsurance generally is
not covered.237 The state guaranty funds have been created over the past
two decades based on a model proposed by the NAIC in 1969, but the
funds differ in details such as deductibles, policy limits, and the like.
230 See id.
231 See id. at 3.
232 See id. These priorities include "refining the financial examination process; expanding
the information provided in annual statement on material transactions; creating a reinsurance
office to assist states in the evaluation of reinsurance companies and contracts; upgrading train-
ing programs for financial analysts, auditors and regulators; and setting up a special committee
to study the receivership process as it applies to insolvent insurance companies." Id.
233 Economists have criticized the NAIC's analysis for failing to predict insolvency reliably.
See, e.g., Robert A. Hershbarger & Geoffrey P. Miller, The NAIC Information System and the
Use of Economic Indicators in Predicting Insolvencies, 9 J. Ins. Issues & Prac. 21 (1986).
Somewhat greater predictive accuracy can apparently be achieved with highly sophisticated
models, see Ran BarNiv & Robert A. Hershbarger, Classifying Financial Distress in the Life
Insurance Industry, 57 J. Risk & Ins. 110 (1990), although none of the models proposed to
date appear particularly robust.
234 See Gastel, supra note 225, at 12-13.
235 See id. at 4.
236 See id.
237 See id. at 12.
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Some states deny coverage to larger corporate policyholders, on the the-
ory that these sophisticated consumers can assess the solvency of insur-
ance firms on their own.238 Nevertheless, the great majority of these
state guaranty funds operate on an assessment system: there is no per-
manent fund in place, but participating insurance companies are assessed
to cover payments to policyholders which are not covered by the assets of
a failed institution.239 Assessments typically are paid either by means of
state-mandated premium increases-in which case the costs are automat-
ically passed on to policyholders in the form of higher prices-or
through tax relief for insurance companies-in which case the effective
incidence of the assessments is passed to the state's taxpayers. 24° For
example, New York, a major insurance market and home to many of the
largest insurance firms, has established a unique permanent fund compa-
rable to bank deposit insurance schemes. 241 At least one of the state as-
sessment systems (Maine's) includes a limited permanent fund for the
payment of policyholders pending collection of assessments. 242
It is likely that additional legislation on guaranty funds will be
adopted in the coming years. One sensible proposal would be to base
assessments on some criterion of risk rather than on the basis of market
share, as under current law,243 because a guaranty system that does not
adjust premiums for risk is certain to induce distortions by providing a
subsidy for riskier institutions at the expense of safer ones.244 The ab-
sence of risk-based deposit insurance premiums is a principal culprit in
the recent debacle in the banking industry, and similar distortions are
undoubtedly introduced into insurance markets as a result of the flat-rate
premium structure under state guaranty systems.
In endorsing the use of risk-adjusted premiums, we do not mean to
imply that it will be easy to determine risk. Evaluating the riskiness of
an insurance firm-especially a property/casualty firm-is difficult be-
cause neither the demands for payment on the liability side of its balance
sheet (policyholders' claims) nor the value or volatility of the assets on
the asset side of the balance sheet can be readily quantified. There are,
238 See id. at 10.
239 See id. The assessments are collected through changes in premium tax rates, insurance
policy surcharges, or changes in premium rates. See id.
240 See generally General Accounting Office, supra note 214. In the case of property/casu-
alty firms, 31 states authorize the recoupment of assessments through premium increases; 17
authorize recoupment through tax relief; one allows either method; and one provides for no
method of recoupment. See id. at 12.
241 See Gastel, supra note 225, at 9.
242 See id.
243 See id.
244 See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, America's Banking System: The Origins
and Future of the Current Crisis, 69 Wash. U. L.Q. 769, 801-03 (1991) (discussing Treasury
Department proposal for risk-based deposit insurance premiums).
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however, several sources of information about the riskiness of insurance
firms which provide at least some useful information on which a tentative
assessment of risk can be based.245 Also potentially valuable, in terms of
assessing risk, is the level of capital in an insurance company. The De-
partment of the Treasury has recently proposed a system of risk-adjusted
deposit insurance premiums for banks based on a measure of risk-ad-
justed capital. 246 Although not without problems, 247 a similar measure
of risk-adjusted capital might prove useful in setting insurance premium
rates for insurance firms.
Another proposal, which strikes us as less sound, is to convert the
existing assessment systems into prefunded plans like New York's. 248
The advantage of a prefunded system is that the money is available im-
mediately to meet policyholder claims. Immediate availability of funds
245 One agency, A.M. Best, has long published ratings for all firms in the industry, and
recently the Standard & Poor's Co. has entered the field with its own credit rating system for
all firms, not just those submitting to claims-paying-ability review. Moody's also rates many
larger insurance firms.
It is unclear how well rating agencies do in practice. The 1990 edition of Best's Insurance
Reports characterized Mutual Benefit Life as "most ably managed" in "the highest ideals of
business equity" and gave the firm its highest rating of "A+ (superior)." Best's Ins. Rep.
(Life-Health) 1521-23 (1990). Best's downgraded Mutual Benefit Life to a "Contingent A" a
few days before it was closed, citing "uncertainties surrounding the timing and ultimate suc-
cess of the company's repositioning plan and capital raising effort." Cynthia Crosson, Mut.
Benefit's A.M. Best Rating Drops One Notch, Nat'l Underwriter, July 15, 1991, at 19. Stan-
dard and Poor's gave Mutual Benefit Life an "A" rating for overall financial health and
claims-paying ability up until a few days prior to the failure. See New Jersey Court Appoints
Conservator of Troubled Mutual Benefit Life Insurance, supra note 226, at 1240. Moody's
also gave Mutual Benefit Life an "A3" rating (the lower part of the "good" category), and only
downgraded it 13 notches to "Caa" a few days before its failure. See Moody's Cuts [Mutual
Benefit] Rating, Reuters Fin. Rep., July 15, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires
File. Nevertheless, in fairness, it should be noted that the earlier, favorable ratings were not
necessarily erroneous, since Mutual Benefit Life failed as a result of a policyholder run rather
than because of any determination of insolvency. See Eric N. Berg, Insurers' Raters Are on
the Spot for Inaccuracy, N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1991, at Al.
The rating agencies did somewhat better in the case of other prominent failures. In the
case of Executive Life Insurance Co. of New York, Best's identified several of the weaknesses
that precipitated its eventual failure, including losses from its sizeable bond portfolio and in-
creased surrenders and withdrawal activity by policyholders. The ultimate rating, however,
was "Contingent A (Excellent)." Best's Ins. Rep. (Life-Health) 753-55 (1990). The Executive
Life Insurance Co. (in California) also received a "Contingent A (Excellent)," with the Best's
report assuring readers that "[a]ctuarial studies indicate that even under a considerable eco-
nomic downturn whereby significant fluctuations in interest rates and increased default rates
would be experienced, together with accelerated surrender and withdrawal activity on the part
of... policyholders, adequate liquidity is maintained to meet any further adverse experience in
these areas." Id. at 751.
246 See generally U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Modernizing the Financial System: Recom-
mendations for Safer, More Competitive Banks (1991).
247 See Macey & Miller, supra note 244, at 790-92 (discussing flaws in Treasury Department
plan for risk-adjusted capital adequacy rules).
248 See Gastel, supra note 225, at 9.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 68:13
HeinOnline -- 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 74 1993
THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT OF 1945
reduces the disruption and hardship to policyholders who would other-
wise have to wait until the completion of an assessment before obtaining
their funds. In the case of life insurance firms, it also reduces the danger
of runs by policyholders with rights to cash in the investment value of
their policies on demand.249 However, despite these advantages, a
prefunded system has serious drawbacks. First, it creates a fund which
can thereafter be used to support government regulations not reasonably
related to solvency regulation, or to bail out other firms not originally
participating in the fund. Second, once a well-capitalized fund is in
place, insurance companies lose some of their incentive to police their
peers in order to prevent assessments. 250 A prefunded plan thus reduces
monitoring incentives by the .parties who would be liable for assessments
under an assessment system.251 If the federal deposit guaranty program
had been an assessment system rather than a richly endowed prefunded
plan, well-managed and solvent banks and thrift institutions might have
organized to prevent the excessive risk taking by others in the industry
which eventuated the industry's crisis. 252 Thus, assessment plans offer a
249 Such a run occurred in the case of Mutual Benefit Life in July 1991, precipitating the
failure of that institution. See generally Pulliam, supra note 9. It should be noted, however,
that New Jersey did not have a guaranty law in effect for life insurance firms at the time. It is
unclear whether policyholders would have run the institution if an assessment-type guaranty
law had been on the books. Further, the danger that a solvent company would have to close
because of a run would be reduced if, as we recommend in this monograph, the Federal Re-
serve Board is brought into service as lender of last resort for the insurance industry. See notes
263-66 and accompanying text infra.
250 As a practical matter, insurance companies retain a fair degree of ability to police their
peers. A firm reputed in the industry to be managed in an excessively risky or improper man-
ner may find it difficult to obtain adequate reinsurance, for example. If the firm uses independ-
ent agents for distribution, it may find that agents are loath to recommend its product to
customers. See Producers and Insolvencies, Nat'l Underwriter, May 28, 1990, at 44 (insurance
regulators want brokers and agents to provide them with information about the financial
health of insurance firms, and to exercise due diligence and reasonable care when placing in-
surance with a company). Insurance firms also exercise influence with state insurance regula-
tors, and may encourage the regulators to take prompt action to address problems in insurance
firms which others in the industry believe to be unsafe or unsound.
251 Of course, even in a prefunded plan the parties required to replenish the fund in the
event of payouts retain some monitoring incentive. However, if the fund is solvent enough, it
may effectively replenish itself through investment income. And even if some assessments are
made, the existence of a fund for the payment of assessment contributes to a breakage in the
connection between the failure of an insurance company and the liability of another to pay an
assessment.
252 Along these same lines, we question why under existing state plans assessments should
be paid by means of premium increases or, worse, by tax relief for insurance firms. These
payment methods operate virtually invisibly, and pass the incidence of the assessments on to
groups which are not well equipped to monitor the behavior of insurance firms in the state-
policyholders and taxpayers. To induce optimal monitoring and mitigate the incentives for
risk taking that are built into any fixed-premium insurance system, the assessments ought to
run against parties well equipped to engage in appropriate monitoring. These parties are other
insurance firms in the state. Rather than being paid wholly by policyholders or taxpayers,
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preferable alternative to prefunded plans along the lines of the New York
scheme, and the present degree of solvency regulation at the state level
appears adequate overall.253
3. Proposals for a New Federal Role in Solvency Regulation
Proposals currently circulating inside the Capitol Beltway to subject
the insurance industry to federal oversight include Congressman John
Dingell's plan to create a federal insurance agency with broad powers to
assessments should be paid partly by the insurance firms covered by the guaranty fund, in
proportion to the volume of business conducted by the firm in the state, with suitable adjust-
ment for the riskiness of the firm being assessed. Moreover, to the extent that assessments are
paid out of tax dollars, rather than from insurance companies directly, it would be better for
these funds to be obtained from taxpayers in some relatively public manner calculated to in-
duce political accountability, rather than through the nearly invisible method of tax relief for
insurance companies, as is the case under current state guaranty systems.
It also is important to note that some of the benefits of prefunded plans can be achieved
through suitable modifications in assessment plans. For example, most states have revised
their plans to allow policyholders early access to the assets of a failed institution ahead of the
claims of other creditors. See Gastel, supra note 225, at 10-11. For instance, Maine has cre-
ated a limited prefunded plan to pay off policyholders in the short run; this may draw a more
reasonable balance between the need to pay off policyholders quickly and the value of peer
group monitoring that assessment plans provide. Id.
253 Another, more appealing, proposal for reform in the insurance industry is the suggestion
that the states enter into an interstate compact subject to the federal oversight inherent in the
requirement of congressional approval. See U.S. Const., art. I, § 10, cl. 2. James M. Jackson,
the leading proponent of this proposal and Vice President and Deputy General Counsel of
Transamerica Life Insurance Co., describes the idea as follows:
By utilizing the "compact clause" of the federal constitution .. the states have the
power to institute any uniform standards, rules, and enforcement mechanism deemed
necessary and appropriate....
... An interstate compact occupies a position of overriding authority with respect
to other statutory law, whether previously or subsequently adopted. The reason... is
that in addition to being [a] statute, an interstate compact also constitutes an enforceable
contract among all the states which become party to it.... Compacts thus provide a
constitutional, statutory, and contractual basis for uniform state regulation.
James M. Jackson, A New Dimension for State Regulation, Nat'l Underwriter, Nov. 19, 1990,
at 21.
An interstate compact would theoretically permit the NAIC or some other body chosen
by the states as a central regulator to exercise compulsory authority over the separate state
insurance departments, and would obviously increase the NAIC's power, since the NAIC cur-
rently operates as a purely voluntary organization without the political power to compel action
by state regulators or insurance companies.
An interstate compact could establish a national association of state insurance regulators
with powers to centralize information gathering and retrieval functions and to promulgate
uniform rules in areas where interstate differences pose special difficulties. Such a national
association could, for example, compile and maintain information about the financial condition
of insurance firms on a nationwide basis; it could establish uniform standards for when an
insurance company is in financial difficulty; it could assist in administering receiverships of
failed institutions that operate interstate; and it could even promulgate uniform capital ade-
quacy standards for firms doing business across state lines.
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displace state regulatory authority. 254 This proposal would establish a
federal insurer solvency corporation with authority to supervise industry
self-regulatory organizations (SROs), which then could authorize an in-
surance company to conduct interstate business free of the substantive
regulation of any state of domicile.255 The result would be a form of
federal chartering of insurance, which would create a structure for the
insurance business similar to the dual banking system now in place for
depository institutions.256 The federal regulator would set minimum
standards for fundamental matters-such as accounting, investment,
capital, and surplus-which states would have to equal or exceed in or-
der to be accredited to regulate insurers in interstate commerce.25 7 The
federal regulator also would exercise authority over the reinsurance busi-
ness and would have the power to close insolvent or shaky insurance
companies. 25 8
As such, the Dingell proposal essentially would federalize insurance
regulation, subject only to vestigial state regulatory oversight. If enacted,
it most probably would lead to the eventual atrophy of state insurance
oversight except in the key area of rate regulation, which explicitly would
be left to state control under current versions of the proposal.25 9 Unlike
other forms of regulation, state rate regulation would likely be more
stringent under the Dingell proposal for several reasons. Deprived of
most other regulatory authority, state insurance regulators would be
likely to return aggressively to rate regulation as a means of maintaining
some of their traditional powers. Expanded rate regulation also would
offer the opportunity for the industry to bring cooperative price-setting
activities within the shelter of the state action doctrine, as discussed pre-
viously.26 Some consumer groups also would favor substantive rate reg-
ulation as a means of rolling back rates they consider to be too high.
Moreover, in an environment of federal solvency regulation, states might
see the benefit of forcing below-market rates on insurers on the basis that
customers in other states could compensate for the shortfall. The
Dingell proposal, in other words, would tend to stifle features of state
regulation that have proven successful, while maintaining and even en-
hancing features that are problematic from the standpoint of social
254 See Frederick Rose, Congressional Proposals on Insurance Would End Primacy of State
Regulation, Wall St. J., Aug. 5, 1991, at B4.
255 See id.
256 For background on the dual banking system, see generally Butler & Macey, supra note
20; Miller, supra note 158; Kenneth Scott, The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competi-
tion in Regulation, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1977).
257 See Rose, supra note 254, at 133.
258 See id.
259 See id.
260 See notes 178-92 and accompanying text supra.
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policy.
Senator Howard Metzenbaum has offered an alternative vision of
reform, in which a federal guaranty fund for insurance policyholders
would displace the existing state guaranty funds.2 61 In our view, this
idea is flawed as well. As the catastrophes over the past few years in the
two principal guaranty funds for banking institutions-the Bank Insur-
ance Fund and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation-
have shown, the last thing the federal government should be doing is
entering into another open-ended contingent obligation with enormous
potential risk exposure. Concern about federal budget deficits alone
should cause the concept of a vast new program of federal insurance
guaranties to be greeted with horror. This is particularly true since there
is no reason to believe that a federal insurance fund will be any less sub-
ject to the problems of moral hazard and perverse incentive structures
that doomed the federal deposit insurance funds over the past few years.
Further, it seems clear that, to the extent guaranty funds exist at all,
they are better administered at the state level than at the federal level. It
should be noted that most state guaranty funds cover only in-state depos-
itors. This limitation in coverage creates a system in which insurance
regulators in other states have a strong incentive to monitor the solvency
regulation of a company's domiciliary state in order to reduce the claims
on their own insurance guaranty systems. The advantages of this moni-
toring of one state's regulator by regulators in other states would be lost
if state guaranty schemes were displaced by a single federal insurance
fund. Moreover, a federal guaranty system would aggravate further the
existing temptation on the part of some states to expropriate the wealth
of citizens of other states by imposing below-market rate regulation.2 62
These considerations suggest that a federal guaranty program for
insurance policyholders would be ill-advised. They also imply that if
261 See text accompanying notes 235-36 supra.
262 In an interesting recent paper, economist Benjamin Zycher explores the probable impact
of federal solvency regulation on state rate setting. See generally Benjamin Zycher, Insurance
Rates, Direct Democracy and Solvency Regulation (1991) (on file with the New York Univer-
sity Law Review). Zycher observes that if the federal government were to regulate the sol-
vency of insurance companies by displacing state guaranty programs with a federal guaranty
fund, state rate-setting bodies inevitably would face irresistible political pressure to set rates
below the market-clearing rate. By setting rates at low levels, states could confer benefits on
their own citizens at the expense of insurance firms and the federal guaranty fund. Eventually
some of the insurance firms would fail as a result of continuing losses, but the costs of the
failures would be borne by the federal insurance fund. As in the banking industry, the result of
federal intervention would be to impair the solvency of the insurance industry. It would also
restrict the supply of insurance, thus harming the policyholders it was ostensibly designed to
protect. Zycher observes that these perverse regulatory results would not occur if solvency
regulation were administered at the state level, since interests within a state would bear the
costs of the state's setting insurance rates at unreasonably low rates.
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such a program were adopted, the administrator of the federal guaranty
fund inevitably would become involved in rate regulation. To protect the
assets of the guaranty fund, the federal administrator would have to su-
pervise the safety and soundness of the institutions under the fund; such
supervision cannot be accomplished effectively if states maintain plenary
control over rate setting. Federal guaranties accordingly would broaden
into generalized federal oversight of the substance of state regulation,
including state rate regulation. The notion of a dual system with a fed-
eral guaranty fund and state regulation of the business of insurance
outside the solvency area is therefore unstable and likely would lead
eventually to broader, preemptive federal oversight of many aspects of
the insurance business.
A final proposal for federal oversight would be to establish the Fed-
eral Reserve Board (Federal Reserve or Fed) as a lender of last resort for
the insurance industry. The recent failure of Mutual Benefit Life Insur-
ance Company 263 brought to public attention the fact that many life in-
surance companies operate with the equivalent of demand or near-
demand debt in their balance sheets. Policyholders have the power to
liquidate the cash value of their annuities and guarantied investment con-
tracts on demand or subject only to a brief notice period.264 This de-
mand and near-demand debt creates the possibility of runs based on
information, whether or not accurate, that the company is in dire finan-
cial straits. The exposure of some life insurance firms to this kind of run
is very large, 265 and has induced major rating firms to consider the risk of
runs as a factor in their evaluation of insurance firms' credit. 266
Property/casualty firms are subject to a related, but slightly differ-
ent, risk. A major earthquake or other extraordinary disaster could re-
sult in tens of billions of dollars of claims being made on the assets of
property/casualty firms within a very short time span. Faced with these
claims, these firms must liquidate their assets rapidly, resulting in "fire-
sale" losses. Some firms with relatively illiquid asset portfolios might be
unable to pay out claims when due. Regulators might be required to
close firms as a result, even though they might be perfectly solvent if
given adequate time to liquidate their assets in an orderly fashion.
We believe these considerations demonstrate the value of a lender of
last resort for the insurance industry-an entity that can advance tempo-
263 See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
264 See Eric N. Berg, Rater to Add Policyholder Panic Factor, N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1991, at
Cl.
265 In the case of Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York, for example, $9.8 billion of its
$14 billion in liabilities could be withdrawn on demand or on short notice. See Richard D.
Hylton, MONY, Sorely Tested, Reassures Customers, N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1991, at Dl.
266 See Berg, supra note 264, at Cl.
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rary liquidity assistance to solvent firms to tide them over until they can
liquidate sufficient assets to pay off the demands of policyholders. The
only suitable lender of last resort at either the state or the federal level is
the Federal Reserve, since there are no state agencies with sufficient capi-
talization to provide this kind of liquidity assistance. The Federal Re-
serve already performs a similar lender-of-last-resort function for the
banking industry.
In suggesting that the Federal Reserve perform this function, we
wish to emphasize that the loans should be truly a matter of last resort.
Even if authorized to provide liquidity assistance to insurance firms, the
Fed should not do so unless it appears that all other feasible sources of
funds have evaporated. Further, the Fed should provide lender-of-last-
resort financing only for temporary liquidity assistance to solvent firms.
In no event should federal assistance be provided to firms that are insol-
vent. Further, any temporary liquidity assistance should be fully secured
or oversecured by marketable collateral. In most cases, such collateral
would be readily available in the form of privately placed debt which
cannot be liquidated quickly at market rates, but which nevertheless has
collateral value. Moreover, before the Fed intervenes with assistance, it
should receive a certification from the insurance commissioner of the
firm's domicile that the firm is not insolvent. In addition, the relevant
state guaranty funds might be required to bear a substantial amount of
the insolvency risk, by means of agreements to indemnify the Fed in the
event that the emergency loans are not repaid and the collateral proves
insufficient to satisfy the shortfall.
With these safeguards in place, the Fed should have adequate assur-
ance of prompt repayment when it advances temporary liquidity assis-
tance. Accordingly, we do not believe that temporary liquidity assistance
by the Federal Reserve needs to be accompanied by any other form of
federal solvency regulation.
C. Rate Regulation
While the various legislative packages under consideration do not
purport to establish federal rate regulation, the proposed federal solvency
regulations could have an indirect but marked impact on this major area
of state insurance regulation. The importance of the issue of rate regula-
tion to the states should not be underplayed: in addition to solvency
regulation, the various mechanisms for setting insurance rates and polic-
ing against deviations from filed rates through rebating comprise the
other major prong of state insurance regulation.
The systems of rate setting at the state level are anomalous, in that
insurance is the only major U.S. industry which is both highly unconcen-
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trated-almost all markets are served by a large number of firms, and no
firm controls enough of the market to exercise market power-and yet
subject to price controls in most of the states. In this Section, we de-
scribe the state rate-setting regimes and then consider the arguments for
and against rate regulation, as well as the impact of proposed federal
solvency regulation on state rate-setting programs. We conclude that in-
surance rates should be set by market forces rather than by any form of
governmental regulation.267
1. State Insurance Commissions
The states generally have adopted two approaches to rate setting,
each with several variants. 268 Most states-approximately thirty in the
case of property/casualty insurance-follow the traditional practice 269 of
requiring that rates be approved in advance by the regulator.270 A few
states, including Massachusetts, require the regulator to set the rate; in
others, the regulator reviews a rate fied by the insurance company itself
or by an independent insurance rating bureau.271 One typical pattern
(sometimes referred to as "flex rating") allows the state to define a range
in which rates can fluctuate from a defined baseline.272 In practice, many
state systems allow for considerable deviation from the filed rates. Com-
mercial filings in some states, for example, can be legally modified by as
much as seventy percent. 273 Actual rates rarely deviate this much from
filed rates, but they may be changed by as much as fifty percent in vola-
tile markets. 274
The remaining states do not require prior approval of rates but in-
stead allow rates to be set by market forces. 275 Most of these states re-
quire that rates be filed prior to or soon after use, and retain the power to
267 Cf. AEI Study, supra note 12, at 89 (concluding that "rigid state rate regulation has had
adverse effects" and that "vigorous competition is consistent with the goal of reasonable
rates").
268 State power to control rates was upheld by the Supreme Court in 1914, see German
Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389 (1914), and has not seriously been questioned since.
269 The system of prior state approval of rates is recommended in the NAIC's "All Indus-
try" model statute, promulgated in 1945 at the time of the enactment of the McCarran-Fergu-
son Act. See Gastel, supra note 60, at 9, 10.
270 See Insurance Info. Inst., supra note 155, at 13.
271 See Gastel, supra note 60, at 9.
272 See id.
273 See Gerald D. Stephens, Please, No More Complaints, Best's Rev., Sept. 1991, at 61.
274 See id.
275 States began to adopt these competitive rate-setting programs in the 1970s. See Gastel,
supra note 225, at 9. It should be noted that California's Proposition 103 represents a return
to the older system of prior approval, albeit with a view toward benefiting consumers rather
than insurance firms. See notes 279-80 and accompanying text infra (discussing Proposition
103).
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reject rates deemed unfair, unreasonable, or excessive. 276 The stringency
of this post hoc review process varies from state to state. Some states,
such as Illinois, provide only minimal state oversight, relying on market
forces to ensure the fairness of rates.277
Over the past few years, state rate-setting activity has become highly
controversial due to consumer-oriented reforms, including rate rollbacks
and structural rate-making reform. Rate rollbacks have typically been
the result of states intervening to hold down rates in particularly sensitive
lines such as automobile insurance. 278 The most prominent recent exam-
ple is California's Proposition 103,279 which, among other things,
repealed the state antitrust exemption for insurance firms, eliminated its
anti-rebate law, and required advance administrative approval for
rates.280 Texas's comprehensive insurance reform of June 1991 also con-
tains many "pro-consumer" features, although it rejected rate regulation
for a general scheme of deregulation in lines such as general liability
and commercial property insurance. These lines are now subject to a
"fie-and-use" requirement that does not require prior administrative
approval.281
In addition to rate rollbacks, some states have adopted structural
reforms of their rate-setting proceedings-changes which in the long run
may have a greater impact than the more highly publicized rate roll-
backs. One such structural reform has been the move toward popular
election of state insurance commissioners to make them more account-
able to the public and presumably less influenced by insurance industry
lobbyists.282 A second important structural reform has been to change
276 See Insurance Info. Inst., supra note 155, at 13.
277 See Stephens, supra note 273, at 61.
278 Massachusetts regulators have reportedly been holding automobile insurance rates be-
low market-clearing rates. See Muhl, supra note 137, at 28.
279 Codified at Cal. Ins. Code § 1861.01-.16 (Deering 1992).
280 See id. Proposition 103 also allowed banks to sell insurance, required an immediate
20% reduction in automobile, homeowners', commercial, and municipal liability rates, and
froze rate increases for a year subject to a limited waiver for cases where the insurer could
establish that it was substantially threatened with insolvency. See id.
281 See Fayhee, supra note 131, at 6. Other lines, such as private passenger auto, commer-
cial auto, and personal property insurance, are subject to more stringent regulation, but even
for these lines a firm may file and use a rate, without prior approval, so long as it remains
within a "flex band" of the administratively-established benchmark rate. See id.
282 If recent experience in California is illustrative, this move to elected officials may affect
insurance regulation in relatively significant ways. Early in 1991, the newly-elected insurance
commissioner of that state, John Garamendi, received widespread publicity by announcing
that insurance company capital not used to write business in California would henceforth be
included in the rate base and indicating that he intended to rescind rate increases approved by
his predecessor in office. See Wojcik, supra note 128, at 1. Mr. Garamendi vowed to "put
bigger rollbacks in consumers' pockets and crack down on excessive rates in the future." See
id. Consumer advocate Ralph Nader praised the new commissioner, observing that "because
the former regime so arrogantly refused to enforce the will of the people, the new commis-
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the procedures for rate setting by providing consumer and public interest
representatives explicit representation in rate-setting procedures. 283
Nevertheless, consumer legislation of this sort sometimes results in a
transfer of wealth from insurance firms to consumers. A number of stud-
ies of Proposition 103 have documented significant negative impacts on
insurance company stock prices in the days surrounding the election in
which Proposition 103 was adopted.284 These wealth effects do not in
themselves establish that Proposition 103 and like programs are undesir-
able as a matter of social policy. If insurance companies have been sys-
tematically overcharging, as consumer advocates claim, the rate roll-
backs
could actually increase the efficiency of insurance markets relative to the
current system, although it is very unlikely that administered rates of the
sort now enforced in California would be more efficient than rates set by
market forces. However, if rates are set too low, there is an obvious
threat to insurance company solvency. Thus, while it is too early to say
whether state rate-rollback legislation actually threatens the solvency of
insurance firms, ratings companies like the A.M. Best Company have
issued qualified ratings for firms exposed to the financial uncertainties of
regulatory programs in California, New Jersey, Kentucky, Massachu-
setts, Michigan, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and South
Carolina. 285
2. Market Forces
The traditional argument in favor of state rate regulation is that
state control over rates is necessary in order to protect consumers.286
sioner's responsibility is clear." Id. This kind of regulatory populism plays well at the ballot
box, and can be expected to occur more frequently as other states move toward elected insur-
ance commissioners.
283 Texas, for example, now requires that a consumer advocate be allowed to participate in
insurance rate-setting proceedings. See Tex. Ins. Code Ann. arts. 135A, 5101 (West Supp.
1993). In addition, California's Proposition 103 created a "consumer advocacy corporation"
to represent consumer interests in insurance matters, but the California Supreme Court struck
the provision down as violative of the state constitution. See Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian,
771 P.2d 1247, 1263 (Cal. 1989).
284 See generally Joseph A. Fields, Chinmoy Ghosh, David S. Kidwell & Linda S. Klein,
Wealth Effects of Regulatory Reform: The Reaction to California's Proposition 103, 28 J. Fin.
Econ. 233 (1990); Shelor & Cross, supra note 132; Samuel H. Szewczyk & Raj Varma, The
Effect of Proposition 103 on Insurers: Evidence from the Capital Market, 28 J. Risk & Ins.
671 (1990).
285 See Paul E. Wish, Review and Preview: 1990 and 1991, Best's Rev., Sept. 1991, at 14.
286 Historically, rate regulation entered the insurance business during the populist era of the
early twentieth century. Many states, over the vigorous opposition of the insurance industry,
asserted the power to set rates and used that power to force insurance companies to lower the
rates that they previously had been charging. Kansas and Texas enacted the first rate regula-
tion statutes in 1909 and quickly decreed reductions in insurance rates. See generally H.
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The argument has two main strands: first, that by virtue of their power
and superior bargaining position insurance companies are likely to over-
charge consumers unless the state controls the permissible rates; and,
second, that insurance contracts are highly complex instruments which
are difficult for consumers to understand and compare. Although these
arguments are often lumped together, they are conceptually distinct: the
first is premised on bargaining power, and the second is based on infor-
mation costs. In one form or another, these are the principal justifica-
tions for rate regulation heard today.
We find these arguments unpersuasive. There is little reason to sup-
pose that a state can do a better job than the market at setting rates.
Insurance rates, like any other prices, should be set by market forces
under conditions of free competition. Any system of administered rates
carries with it serious dangers of marketplace distortions. This is true
regardless of whether rates are rolled back-as is happening in California
and other states with consumer reform legislation on the books-or
maintained at excessively high rates in order to enrich the coffers of in-
surance firms.
Some consumer advocates may believe that a return to administered
prices, such as that seen recently in California, ensures that prices will
not be set too high. But if the history of insurance regulation is a guide,
populist revolts against insurance pricing rarely endure for long. Many
states adopted price regulation during the populist revolt of the early
twentieth century, and the initial experience under these systems was un-
favorable to the insurance industry.287 Over time, however, the industry
established influence over all or nearly all state insurance commissions,
and before long the power to administer prices was being utilized to ap-
prove and enforce rates set by industry rating bureaus that operated, at
the time at least, as little more than highly efficient and well-organized
cartels. 288 It is quite possible that when the fervor of the current populist
revolt over insurance rates dies down-as it inevitably will-the industry
will be able to reassert its power and even to turn administered pricing
systems to its own advantage. 28 9
Roger Grant, Insurance Reform: Consumer Action in the Progressive Era (1979).
287 See id. at 55-70.
288 This story of industry regulation is well-documented in the standard histories of the
industry, most notably in H. Grant, supra note 286. See also M. Keller, The Life Insurance
Enterprise, 1885-1910 (1963). Grant and other historians, however, miss many of the implica-
tions of their own evidence because of their failure to appreciate the importance of cartels in
the development of the industry in the period they study.
289 The danger of cartelization under the guise of rate setting is somewhat reduced by the
structural reforms, discussed earlier, see notes 282-83 and accompanying text supra, which
attempt to impose a political check on industry capture of state insurance commissions. Such
structural reforms may have an impact, but whether they will endure as effective checks on
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In addition to the market distortions and shortages caused by state
rate regulation, there are the costs of administering such systems to con-
sider. In the scheme of things these costs are fairly small-Proposition
103 reportedly added $25 million to the budget of California's insurance
department 29 0-they are not insignificant and suggest another, albeit
marginal, reason for not imposing a system of administered price regula-
tion on a highly competitive industry such as insurance.
State-administered rates might have some appeal if it could be
shown that private market forces would not work effectively to set rates
at appropriate levels. There is no evidence, however, that if suitable anti-
trust protections were in place, the industry would not set rates at effi-
cient levels. Such evidence as exists suggests the contrary. For example,
Illinois, which went to free-market rate setting for most lines in 1971, has
experienced no serious difficulties with rates. Premiums in Illinois for
automobile and homeowners' insurance are substantially lower than
those in other industrial metropolitan states.291
The insurance industry is ideally suited to rate setting by competi-
tive forces. As economist Paul Joskow has observed:
[T]he property-liability insurance industry possesses the structural
characteristics normally associated with the idealized competitive mar-
ket: a large number of firms, operating in a market with low concen-
tration levels, selling essentially identical products, provided at
constant unit costs and with ease of entry of new and potential compet-
itors.... It is... difficult to find... many other industries which
conform more closely to the economist's idealized competitive market
structure. 292
Joskow's comments about the property-liability industry apply
equally well to the life insurance industry, in which there are also many
producers selling very similar products. Based on these observations
about industry structure, Joskow suggests that insurance rates and rating
classifications should not be regulated at all:
There are no natural monopoly characteristics which would indicate
that open competition would be unstable and eventually lead to mo-
nopoly. Rather, the argument has been that rate making in concert
through rating bureaus is a necessity to insure the public and the in-
dustry against "destructive" competition and large numbers of bank-
capture in the long run remains to be seen.
290 See Stamp, supra note 62, at 45.
291 See id. at 48. An earlier study, however, found no evidence that rates for automobile
insurance are higher in states with prior approval laws than in states without prior approval
laws. See Richard A. Ippolito, The Effects of Price Regulation in the Automobile Insurance
Industry, 22 J.L. & Econ. 55 (1979).
292 Paul Joskow, Cartels, Competition and Regulation in the Property-Liability Insurance
Industry, 4 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 375, 391 (1973).
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ruptcies. There does not seem to be any reason why this industry
should be more unstable than others.293
Consumer groups may seek state rate regulation because they see
state regulation as a means for rolling back rates and accomplishing
other policy objectives. Insurance regulators may favor rate regulation
because they perceive that increased state control over rates will expand
their powers, their budgets, and their political standing. And insurance
companies may favor rate regulation as a shield against the federal anti-
trust laws. Thus, a potent political coalition in favor of enhanced state
rate regulation might well develop.
However, increased state involvement with the rate-setting process
would not be a constructive development because the rates as set are
unlikely to track market-clearing rates. Instead, they would reflect align-
ments of political power within a given state. At times when "consumer"
interests are strong, the rates likely would be set below the market-clear-
ing rates, resulting in losses to insurance companies and distortions in the
production of insurance products.2 94 At other times, when industry
groups are more powerful, rates likely would be set too high, resulting
again in wealth-reducing distortions in insurance markets, as too little
insurance would be purchased. Neither of these results would be desir-
able from the standpoint of either consumers or the general public.
Our conclusion, in short, is that states should not set rates for insur-
ance products. This does not mean, however, that the federal govern-
ment should set rates. As uneconomical as state rate setting would be,
federal rate setting would likely be worse, since it would be very difficult,
at the federal level, to take account of regional or local conditions which
affect the profitability of different insurance products. Accordingly, we
conclude that neither the states nor the federal government should set
insurance rates.
This suggests that in an ideal world the federal government would
adopt legislation which would not only disclaim any purpose to set rates
at the federal level, but which also would preempt state efforts to set rates
administratively. We do not recommend preemptive federal legislation
at this time, however, both because the need for it is not yet clearly estab-
lished, and because corrective forces acting in the private sector may be
sufficient to head off any major return to rate regulation by individual
states.
We do recommend, however, a more limited federal preemption of
293 Id. at 423.
294 The short-term consequence of rates set below the market-clearing rate likely would be
the excessive purchasing of insurance by persons wishing to take advantage of the below-mar-
ket rates. In the long term, however, the result likely would be the underproduction of insur-
ance as firms leave the market to avoid incurring additional losses.
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state regulatory authority. As already noted, the threat that rates will be
set too low has been checked historically by the ability of insurance firms
to exit markets which become unattractive due to adverse regulatory pol-
icies.2 95 Recently, some states have implemented, or have considered im-
plementing, penalties or "exit fees" to deter firms from leaving markets
in response to state regulatory initiatives. These "lock-in" rules under-
mine longstanding marketplace checks against state expropriation of in-
surance industry assets. In the long run, they may well harm consumers
(by reducing the supply of insurance), undermine industry solvency, and
spark an unhealthy competition in which states vie to set rates at unreal-
istically low levels in order to benefit their own citizens at the expense of
citizens of other states. The problem of exit fees is serious enough to
warrant a limited preemption to prohibit states from penalizing any firm
that elects either to leave a state altogether or to leave any line of insur-
ance within a state, when the firm's decision is based on economic cost
factors and is not part of any boycott or cooperative enterprise intended
to pressure the state to alter or amend its regulations.
CONCLUSION
This Article has reexamined the structure of regulatory federalism
established by the MeCarran-Ferguson Act. With respect to the anti-
trust exemption, we conclude that the boycott exception to the McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act should be interpreted to permit vigorous enforcement
against industry practices that suppress or threaten to suppress competi-
tion. Similarly, state action immunity should be limited to situations in
which the activity in question is both (a) endorsed by state legislation or
regulation, and not merely permitted as a matter of administrative prac-
tice or authorized by implication, and (b) subject to active, continuous,
and meaningful state oversight. At the same time, there are good reasons
for retaining the antitrust exemption for a fairly wide range of coopera-
tive activities within the industry, including the compilation and dissemi-
nation of historical and prospective loss cost data and the production of
nonexclusive standardized forms and policies. It thus may be useful to
formulate explicit safe-harbor legislation in the future to protect those
cooperative activities if the McCarran-Ferguson Act is repealed or re-
vised by Congress, or interpreted by the judiciary in such a way as to
raise questions about the legality under federal antitrust law of such legit-
imate cooperative activities.
Furthermore, we do not believe it is appropriate at this time to insti-
tute federal solvency regulation. Despite recent failures, the insurance
industry is not now undergoing a solvency crisis, and the overall per-
295 See note 130 and accompanying text supra.
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formance of state insurance regulators at safeguarding insurance com-
pany solvency has been adequate-in stark contrast to the abysmal
failure of federal banking regulators to ensure the solvency of that indus-
try. Limited federal involvement through an interstate compact, how-
ever, might be a useful means for rationalizing and coordinating state
regulatory programs.
We further conclude that there are no good arguments for govern-
ment control over rates in this highly unconcentrated, potentially com-
petitive industry. Rates should be set by market forces. In light of the
trend among the states toward market rate setting, which only recently
has been interrupted by an unfortunate regression toward administered
rates in several states, we conclude that the time is not yet ripe for pre-
emptive federal regulation displacing state authority over insurance rates.
We do recommend, however, that the federal government preempt state
"lock-in" rules that penalize firms wishing to exit a state altogether or to
cease offering a line of insurance within a state, when the firm's decision
to leave is based on economic cost considerations and is not part of any
plan or agreement to boycott a state in order to pressure regulators to
change their regulations.
The insurance industry is now undergoing enormous marketplace
and regulatory strains, and calls for federal intervention have reached a
fever pitch. Nevertheless, a considered study of the industry reveals that
the appropriate resolution of its existing problems requires less federal
involvement than conventional wisdom might suggest.
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